Evidence from 2023–2025 shows that a much larger wave of markdowns, down‑rounds, and loss recognition in late‑stage VC and growth portfolios did in fact play out after April 2023, relative to what had been recognized up to that point.

By mid‑2023, reporting on venture‑fund performance showed that funds had already begun marking down portfolios, but LPs and analysts were still warning that most write‑downs were yet to come. Returns for venture funds were negative for multiple consecutive quarters in 2022, with large, late‑stage‑heavy funds driving the worst performance; Tiger Global, for example, had already marked down its private startup holdings by about 33% in 2022, erasing roughly $23 billion in value, while investors expected “the bulk of startup write‑downs” was still ahead. (devdiscourse.com) This matches Chamath’s framing that the recognition process had “barely begun” by spring 2023.

Over the following 1–2 years, quantitative data show a broad, historically large reset in private valuations, with down‑rounds and write‑downs particularly concentrated in later‑stage companies:

• Carta’s State of Private Markets reports for 2023 and 2024 show that roughly 19–20% of all venture rounds in 2023, and about 20% on average over 2023–2024, were down rounds—about double the ~10% rate seen from 2019 through mid‑2022, and the highest sustained levels in their dataset. (carta.com) Q1 2024 saw an even higher spike, with about 23–24% of new rounds being down rounds, a five‑year high. (crowdfundinsider.com) Cooley’s Q4 2023 venture report likewise found that 25% of deals that quarter were down rounds—one of the highest readings in the history of their report and well above normal. (cooley.com)
• Carta’s 2024 year‑in‑review notes that late‑stage valuations were hit especially hard: combined valuations at Series E+ were down 18% year‑over‑year, consistent with significant markdowns in late‑stage VC portfolios that had been priced at 2021 peaks. (carta.com) An independent analysis of VC fund activity by AVP finds that late‑stage and growth portfolios experienced larger net value write‑downs than early‑stage funds in 2022–2023, reflecting how the steep 2019–2021 step‑up at late stage was followed by disproportionately large post‑2021 write‑downs. (avpcap.com)
• Crossover and late‑stage investors (the ones most exposed to 2020–2021 unicorn rounds) publicly reported large markdowns on individual holdings: Tiger Global’s venture funds, SoftBank’s Vision Fund, and public‑markets managers like Fidelity and BlackRock all disclosed substantial valuation cuts to prominent late‑stage companies (Stripe, Reddit, Grammarly, Gopuff and others), indicating that losses were being formally recognized across many large late‑stage portfolios. (gifp.us.org)
• The correction also showed up in real company outcomes: shutdowns and insolvencies of VC‑backed startups surged. Carta data cited by the Financial Times report that 254 of its venture‑backed clients shut down in Q1 2024 alone, with the bankruptcy rate more than seven times 2019 levels—a concrete form of loss crystallization for many late‑stage investors who had funded these companies at high valuations during the 2020–2021 boom. (ft.com)

Timing-wise, the bulk of this adjustment did occur in roughly the 2023–early‑2025 window Chamath pointed to. By mid‑2024, Carta’s data show the share of down rounds starting to decline from the Q1 2024 peak, suggesting the most intense phase of repricing was passing. (carta.com) A 2025 analysis of European VC valuations similarly notes that the proportion of down rounds fell in 2025 from the elevated ~18–19% levels of 2023, concluding that “the worst of the market rationalization that began in late 2022 has passed,” even though some sectors (notably AI) still face elevated correction risk. (developmentcorporate.com)

Some commentators in 2024–2025 still argue that many “zombie unicorns” remain on books at overly optimistic marks and that another round of write‑downs is likely. (duetpartners.com) That debate speaks to whether the clearing process is fully finished, not to whether a much larger wave of markdowns occurred. On the core claim—that, as of April 2023, the recognition of losses in late‑stage VC portfolios was only in its early innings and that a materially larger wave of markdowns and restructurings would arrive over the next 1–2 years—the subsequent data and industry reporting are broadly consistent. Hence, the prediction is best characterized as right (directionally and within the stated timeframe), even if some residual overvaluation remains in parts of the market.