The prediction mixed several claims:

1. Office utilization falls but offices are not “destroyed”.
   Evidence supports this. U.S. office vacancy reached about 19–20% in 2024, the highest in at least 40 years, while access‑control data show average office occupancy in major U.S. cities stabilizing around ~50–55% of pre‑Covid levels—far below 2019, but clearly not zero. (fortune.com) In 2025, more obsolete office space is being demolished or converted than new space is being built, but a large office sector still operates. (nypost.com) This part of Chamath’s view is broadly accurate.

2. Companies move toward smaller, more flexible footprints.
   Surveys of U.S. office occupiers by CBRE in 2023–24 found that more than half of large tenants planned to reduce their office space, with demand concentrating in higher‑quality, more efficient buildings; CBRE’s 2025 mid‑year outlook notes smaller occupiers as key drivers of leasing and a persistent “flight to quality.” (cbre.com) This fits his expectation that firms would "get much smarter about getting smaller spaces and having flex spaces."

3. "Things like WeWork do better" than pre‑pandemic.
   This is clearly wrong for WeWork, the specific example he named. WeWork’s losses and lease obligations remained so severe that it filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in November 2023, after accumulating more than $10 billion in losses and seeing its equity value fall over 99% from its peak. (forbes.com) The company only exited Chapter 11 in mid‑2024 after eliminating over $4 billion of debt and shedding roughly a third of its locations and a large share of future rent obligations—hardly “doing better” than its pre‑Covid condition as a high‑growth private unicorn. (reuters.com)

   The flex‑space sector overall has benefited from hybrid work—rival IWG (Regus/Spaces) has reported record revenues and significantly higher profits in 2023–24 and continued expansion and revenue growth in 2025. (reuters.com) But Chamath’s formulation tied the thesis specifically to "things like WeWork," and WeWork’s business performance has deteriorated dramatically relative to pre‑pandemic conditions.

Because the core causal claim that flexible‑space providers "such as WeWork" would perform better than before Covid has not come true for WeWork itself—even though enough time has passed to judge—this prediction is best classified as wrong overall, despite being partly right about lower office utilization and the structural shift toward smaller, more flexible offices.