The prediction ties Democrats’ chances of winning the White House to having a “bad economy” going into November 2024, which makes it inherently conditional and somewhat vague.

What actually happened:

• Democrats did lose the White House: Donald Trump defeated Kamala Harris on November 5, 2024, winning 312–226 in the Electoral College and by about 1.5 points in the popular vote. (en.wikipedia.org) That outcome is consistent with Chamath’s claim that it would be “very difficult” for Democrats to win under unfavorable economic conditions.

State of the economy going into November 2024 (hard data):

• Real GDP was still expanding at a solid pace: 3.1% annualized in Q3 2024 and about 2.3–2.4% in Q4, with full‑year 2024 growth around 2.8%. That’s moderate, positive growth, not a technical or NBER‑defined recession. (forbes.com)
• The unemployment rate in October 2024 was 4.1% (up from 3.8% a year earlier but still historically low). Job creation in October, however, was anemic—only about 12,000 jobs added, the weakest since 2020, largely due to hurricanes and a Boeing strike—producing very negative pre‑election headlines. (bls.gov)
• Inflation, while still above the Fed’s 2% target, had fallen sharply from its 2022 peak; October 2024 CPI was up about 2.6% year‑over‑year with core at 3.3%, roughly in line with expectations and compatible with a “soft landing” narrative. (cnbc.com)
• Some indicators of sentiment were improving: the Conference Board’s Consumer Confidence Index jumped to 108.7 in October 2024, with the Expectations Index rising above the 80 level that typically signals recession risk, suggesting statistical confidence was not recession‑like. (prnewswire.com)

Public perception and political framing:

• Despite solid macro data, most voters felt the economy was bad. Exit and pre‑election polling showed the economy/inflation as the top concern, with majorities rating conditions as “not so good” or “poor” and many saying they were falling behind financially. (foxbusiness.com) Analysts widely argued that lingering affordability and inflation pain were central to Harris’s loss.

Why the forecast is hard to score cleanly:

• The antecedent (“a bad economy like what it looks like going into November”) is ambiguous. On objective macro metrics (growth, unemployment, inflation), the U.S. was not in a recession and was performing reasonably well; on voter sentiment and headlines (weak October jobs report, high perceived prices, majority saying the economy is poor), conditions looked bad to many voters.
• The consequent is probabilistic and qualitative (“very difficult” to win), not a crisp claim like “Democrats will lose.” Democrats did in fact lose, which is consistent with his statement, but doesn’t prove it was because economic conditions were bad or that the causal relationship was as strong as implied.

Because (1) the “bad economy” condition is only partly satisfied depending on whether you emphasize macro data versus public perception, and (2) the claim is framed in loose, probabilistic language rather than a clear yes/no outcome, the prediction cannot be judged definitively as right or wrong even though we now know the election result.

Hence the outcome is best classified as ambiguous rather than clearly right or clearly wrong.