The September 17–18, 2024 FOMC meeting did, in fact, deliver a rate cut, and larger than the minimum threshold in the normalized prediction. The target range for the federal funds rate was reduced from 5.25–5.50% to 4.75–5.00%, a 50 basis point cut.(federalreserve.gov) This satisfies the normalized claim that there would be at least a 25 bp cut, even though Chamath’s exact off‑the-cuff wording (“probably going to cut 25”) understated the eventual size of the move.

The minutes show that a “substantial majority” of FOMC participants supported the 50 bp cut, while a minority would have preferred only 25 bp, and Powell voted with the majority.(federalreserve.gov) That pattern is consistent with the idea that, given sufficient committee support, Powell was willing to go to 50 bp rather than being anchored to 25 bp, which matches the conditional part of the prediction about his inclination, even though his exact internal preferences cannot be directly observed.

The final part of the prediction—that this rate cut would not materially resolve the underlying weakness in consumers’ purchasing power and economic stress—is also borne out by subsequent data. By late 2024, U.S. credit‑card defaults had risen to their highest level since 2010, with tens of billions of dollars in write‑offs, underscoring mounting financial strain, especially for lower‑income households.(ft.com) Analyses of household finances through 2024–25 highlight that, despite some improvement in aggregate real incomes, cumulative inflation and high living costs continued to erode resilience, with elevated consumer debt and rising delinquencies particularly among vulnerable groups.(compete.org) Real consumer spending growth showed periods of softness and small declines once adjusted for inflation, indicating that purchasing power pressures persisted rather than being “solved” by a single rate cut.(theglobalstatistics.com)

Taken together, the core normalized elements came true: the Fed cut the policy rate by at least 25 bp at the September 2024 meeting; conditions were such that a larger (50 bp) cut was chosen with broad committee backing; and that easing did not eliminate the underlying consumer‑side weakness or cost‑of‑living pressures. The prediction is therefore best classified as right, with the caveat that Chamath verbally low‑balled the eventual cut size when he said “probably 25.”