Evidence since late 2022 lines up with Chamath’s core claims about (1) the SPR being heavily depleted and thus less available as a price‑control tool and (2) Saudi/OPEC+ choosing to cut output despite U.S. preferences.

1. SPR depletion and limited room for further price‑suppressing releases

• Between Biden’s inauguration and mid‑2023, about 291 million barrels were sold from the SPR, a 46% reduction, taking stocks down to roughly 347 million barrels—levels last seen in the early 1980s. (forbes.com)
• As of April 2024, the SPR held about 365.7 million barrels, down 38% from end‑2021, and analysts explicitly noted that this “limited capacity restricts its effectiveness in stabilizing markets.” (investopedia.com)
• CRS and EIA data show that by end‑2024 the SPR was still only around 394 million barrels, well below both its physical capacity (~714 million barrels) and its pre‑2022 level (~600+ million barrels). (congress.gov)
• After the record 2022 emergency release (180 million barrels) the administration did not execute another comparably large discretionary release; instead, policy shifted toward modest refilling and managing congressionally mandated sales. (en.wikipedia.org)

Taken together, the U.S. did end up with a much smaller SPR and politically/security‑constrained scope for further big drawdowns to “bring the price down,” which matches Chamath’s point that the reserve was effectively “running out” as a repeatable price‑suppression tool.

2. Saudi Arabia/OPEC+ cuts to support higher prices, despite weak U.S. leverage

• Relations with Saudi Arabia were already described as at a low point in 2022; the Saudis rejected U.S. requests to delay or soften an October 2022 OPEC+ cut of 2 million bpd, and Biden publicly threatened “consequences,” illustrating limited leverage. (en.wikipedia.org)
• After Chamath’s November 2022 comments, OPEC+ executed multiple further rounds of cuts: a 1.65 million bpd voluntary cut by key members in April 2023, followed by an additional 2.2 million bpd of voluntary cuts for 2024, on top of an earlier 2 million bpd group cut—bringing total reductions to about 5.3 million bpd (≈5% of global demand) as of 2025. (opec.org)
• Saudi Arabia specifically layered on a 1 million bpd unilateral cut in mid‑2023 and repeatedly extended it through at least mid‑2024, keeping its output near 9 million bpd. (cnbc.com)
• These cuts were consistently framed by OPEC+ and Riyadh as measures to “support market stability” and prevent price declines, i.e., to actively manage prices rather than accede to U.S. pressure for higher output.

3. Impact on the Biden administration’s ability to use SPR or diplomacy to lower gas prices

• By 2023–2024, commentators and analysts were explicitly warning that the reduced SPR volume limited its usefulness as a market‑stabilization and price‑management tool. (investopedia.com)
• Despite U.S. political pressure, Saudi Arabia and OPEC+ maintained significant output restraint throughout the remainder of Biden’s term; the first clear OPEC+ production hike doesn’t come until April 2025, under the subsequent administration. (reuters.com)
• U.S. gasoline prices did fall from their 2022 peak (from an average of about $4.08/gal in 2022 to the low‑$3 range in 2023–2025), but EIA and other analyses attribute this primarily to broader supply‑demand dynamics and rising non‑OPEC production, not to new large SPR releases or successful U.S. pressure on OPEC+. (eia.gov)

So even though global prices eventually eased, the mechanism Chamath described is broadly borne out: after an unprecedented SPR drawdown, the U.S. had much less room for further politically acceptable releases, and Saudi/OPEC+ responded with sustained supply cuts that Washington could not prevent. That combination did, in practice, constrain the Biden administration’s ability to further reduce gasoline prices via SPR deployments or diplomatic leverage, making the prediction substantively correct.