As of November 2025 it is too early to decisively judge a prediction framed as happening “over the coming decades after 2022.” Only about three years have elapsed, and long‑run demographic effects on GDP, living standards, and political expectations typically play out over 10–30 years.

India:

• Real GDP growth has been strong: IMF data show India growing about 7–8% in 2022–23 and projected around 6.5% in 2024/25 and 2025/26, keeping it among the fastest‑growing major economies. (imf.org)
• The World Bank notes that since 2000 the economy has nearly quadrupled in real terms and that extreme poverty fell from roughly 16.2% in 2011–12 to about 2.3% in 2022–23 (with other World Bank updates citing ~5.3% using a higher poverty line), implying large gains in material living standards. (worldbank.org)
• This is broadly consistent with the “rising GDP” and “rising expectations of living quality” parts of the prediction for India, though most of this trend predates 2022 and cannot yet be attributed specifically to post‑2022 demographics.

Nigeria:

• Nigeria’s GDP has grown modestly: IMF and World Bank reports show real growth around 2.9% in 2023 and about 3.4% in 2024 (the fastest since 2014, excluding the immediate post‑COVID rebound), with projections in the mid‑3% range and some improvement in fiscal and external indicators. (imf.org)
• However, living standards have not clearly risen. World Bank and other analyses indicate poverty has increased: more than half of Nigerians are now below the national poverty line, with estimates of roughly 46–56% poor, and Nigeria accounts for around 15% of the world’s extreme poor. High inflation—especially food inflation—has produced a severe cost‑of‑living crisis. (vanguardngr.com)
• These outcomes cut against the near‑term idea of “rising standards of living” in Nigeria, even if GDP itself is growing.

Expectations of government performance:

• Quantifying “rising expectations” is difficult. There is circumstantial evidence: mass protests in Nigeria in 2024 under the #EndBadGovernance banner, driven by dissatisfaction with economic hardship and governance, suggest strong and possibly rising demands on the state. (en.wikipedia.org) In India, official discourse explicitly acknowledges that public expectations for efficient, transparent service delivery are rising. (business-standard.com) But these indicators are qualitative and too short‑run to establish a decades‑long structural trend.

Overall assessment:

• For India, early‑2020s data are broadly in line with Chamath’s narrative (rising GDP and improved living standards, with growing demands on government), though these trends long predate 2022 and may arise from many factors besides demographics.
• For Nigeria, GDP is improving but poverty and cost‑of‑living pressures have worsened, so the living‑standards component is not yet validated.
• Because (1) the forecast explicitly concerns “coming decades”, and (2) the evidence since 2022 is mixed—especially for Nigeria—it is too early to say whether the prediction will ultimately be right or wrong.

Hence the appropriate verdict is inconclusive (too early) rather than right, wrong, or permanently ambiguous.