Chamath’s claim had two main parts:

1. The U.S. will not be able to scale nuclear power in a major way.
2. Most growth in non‑fossil electricity will come from solar rather than nuclear.

What has happened since early 2022?

• Nuclear has not scaled up materially so far.

  • As of mid‑2025, the U.S. has ~97 GWe of operable nuclear capacity and zero reactors under construction. World Nuclear Association notes 94 operating reactors totaling 96,952 MWe and 0 MWe under construction, with nuclear providing about 19% of U.S. electricity in 2023—essentially the same share as decades ago. (world-nuclear.org)
  • The only large new U.S. reactors to come online in this period are Vogtle Units 3 and 4 in Georgia (Unit 3 in July 2023, Unit 4 in April 2024), after huge delays and cost overruns. (georgiapower.com)
  • Nuclear’s share of U.S. electricity has stayed roughly flat or slightly down: ~18.2–18.5% in 2022–2024, not a “large new fleet” or materially larger share of the national mix. (ycharts.com)

• Solar is the dominant source of new non‑fossil generation.

  • EIA and industry summaries show solar is the leading source of new U.S. generating capacity and generation growth through at least 2025. One EIA‑based analysis notes solar is expected to be “the leading source of growth in U.S. power sector generation through the end of 2025,” with about 79 GW of new solar capacity added in 2024–2025. (utilitydive.com)
  • EIA Short‑Term Energy Outlook projections for 2025–2026 explicitly say solar supplies most of the increase in U.S. electricity generation, with very modest nuclear growth (on the order of a few tens of TWh vs much larger solar gains). (publicpower.org)
  • 2024 data show renewables at ~24% of U.S. generation, with solar nearly 7% and still the fastest‑growing source; renewables’ output grew >10× faster than nuclear that year, underscoring that new non‑fossil growth is coming from wind/solar rather than additional nuclear output. (electrek.co)

• Forward‑looking signals are mixed:

  • Policy momentum for nuclear has increased: the U.S. government in 2025 set a target to quadruple nuclear capacity to 400 GWe by 2050, and the Trump administration has moved to fast‑track reactor approvals and bolster uranium supply. (world-nuclear.org)
  • Multiple states are competing to host advanced reactors and SMRs, but no such reactors are yet operating, and at least one flagship SMR project was canceled. Analysts and AP reporting emphasize that deployment remains uncertain due to costs, regulation, and competition from cheap renewables. (apnews.com)
  • EIA projections of the capacity mix through 2035 show solar capacity rising sharply, while nuclear capacity and share stay roughly flat or even slightly decline, suggesting no imminent large‑scale nuclear build‑out in the official baseline outlook. (reuters.com)

Assessment relative to Chamath’s prediction

• The second part of his claim — that growth in non‑fossil electricity would come primarily from solar, not nuclear — is clearly borne out in the 2022–2025 data and in near‑term EIA forecasts.
• The first, stronger part — that America’s ability to scale nuclear in a major way is essentially “never going to happen,” even in the “foreseeable future” — is much harder to judge definitively in 2025. Nuclear has not scaled up in a major way yet, but:
  • Only about half of what most people would call the 2020s “foreseeable future” (say, to ~2030) has elapsed.
  • There is an active policy and industry push to expand nuclear over the coming decades, and significant uncertainty remains about how much of that will actually materialize.

Because the time horizon of the “foreseeable future” has not fully played out and long‑term nuclear deployment is still uncertain despite current trends favoring solar, the prediction cannot be declared definitively right or wrong at this point.

Conclusion: The evidence so far aligns with Chamath’s view (solar is driving non‑fossil growth and nuclear has not scaled up), but given the open‑ended and long‑horizon nature of “never” and “foreseeable future,” the overall prediction is inconclusive as of late 2025.