The shocks were globally significant. The IMF and World Bank both concluded in 2022 that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the associated sanctions created major global supply and demand shocks, sharply raising energy and food prices, downgrading growth (especially in Europe), and hurting poorer countries worldwide. (imf.org) This satisfies the conditional premise of Chamath’s prediction (that the shocks would need to be “really meaningful globally”).

Major central banks did not respond by jointly adding liquidity; they tightened policy instead.

• The Federal Reserve raised the federal funds rate from 0–0.25% in January 2022 to 4.25–4.50% by December 2022 (seven hikes) and began quantitative tightening, explicitly noting that the war and sanctions were adding to inflation via higher commodity prices. (en.wikipedia.org)
• The European Central Bank pivoted from negative rates and asset purchases to rapid hikes starting July 2022, pushing its key rate from -0.5% to around 2% by year‑end and eventually to 4%, in order to fight the inflation surge driven in part by the energy shock from the war. (ecb.europa.eu)
• The Bank of Canada raised its policy rate seven times in 2022 (a total of 400 bps) and engaged in quantitative tightening, repeatedly citing the war in Ukraine as a factor behind higher global energy and food prices and global inflation—not as a reason to supply extra liquidity. (bankofcanada.ca)
• The Bank of Japan maintained its existing ultra‑easy stance and yield‑curve control, but this was a continuation of pre‑war policy and COVID programs, not part of a new, Ukraine‑specific, coordinated liquidity injection with the Fed/ECB/BoC. (boj.or.jp)

There was no 2022 Ukraine‑driven, multi‑central‑bank liquidity initiative like Chamath described. The Fed, ECB, BoC and BoJ do have standing U.S.‑dollar swap lines and have used coordinated liquidity actions in other crises (e.g., March 2020 for COVID and March 2023 for banking stress around SVB/Credit Suisse). (federalreserve.gov) But in 2022, in response to the war and sanctions, their major announced actions were interest‑rate hikes and balance‑sheet reduction, not a new joint program to "step in, in a very coordinated way to provide liquidity to these markets."

The economic pain was not “blunted” only for Russia’s counterparties; it was broadly felt. World Bank and IMF analyses show that the war and sanctions significantly hurt emerging Europe and Central Asia (regional output swing from expected +3% to about –4.1% in 2022), contributed to high inflation and energy‑price shocks in Europe, and raised food and fuel prices globally, especially harming poorer households. (worldbank.org) These are substantial negative consequences for many economies besides Russia, contrary to the claim that coordinated liquidity would largely “blunt” the fallout for everyone except the sanctioned party.

Overall assessment. By late 2022, the condition of globally significant shocks was clearly met, yet the specific central‑bank response Chamath predicted—a coordinated liquidity‑providing intervention by the Fed, ECB, BoC, and BoJ that would shield most of the global economy from the sanctions shock—did not occur. Instead, those banks mostly withdrew liquidity to fight inflation, and the economic damage from the war and sanctions spread well beyond Russia. The prediction is therefore wrong.