Key parts of Chamath’s scenario did not occur.

1. Germany did not “capitulate” on Russia due to the energy crisis.

   • After Russia’s 2022 invasion, Germany moved rapidly to reduce, not restore, dependence on Russian energy: it halted Nord Stream 2, built floating LNG terminals (e.g., Wilhelmshaven, Brunsbüttel, Lubmin) and expanded LNG capacity to replace piped Russian gas. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • By 2024 Russia’s share of German imports had collapsed to about 0.1% of total imports, with overall imports from Russia down 95% versus pre‑war levels, indicating a drastic decoupling rather than a political climb‑down. (dw.com)
   • Berlin has even instructed its state LNG terminal operator not to accept Russian LNG at government‑chartered terminals. (spglobal.com)

2. Germany’s overall stance hardened instead of leading a soft reconciliation.

   • Germany is among the largest individual providers of military aid to Ukraine and, by mid‑2025, is the top European military donor, with tens of billions of euros committed. (statista.com)
   • The government explicitly frames its policy as sustaining sanctions and military support until Russia changes course, and backs successive EU sanctions packages against Russia. (bundesfinanzministerium.de)
   • Germany has simultaneously launched a major, long‑term defense buildup, not a rapprochement with Moscow. (breakingdefense.com)

3. No Germany‑led Western political settlement with Russia has been achieved.

   • As of late 2025, there is no comprehensive political settlement ending the war. Instead, a controversial U.S.-driven 28‑point peace plan—developed largely in U.S.–Russia channels—has emerged, with Europeans (including Germany) reacting critically and pushing counter‑proposals, rather than jointly leading a compromise that concedes to Russia. (en.wikipedia.org)

Because Germany neither became the first major European state to fold on its hardline stance toward Russia nor co‑led a successful, concessionary political settlement, the prediction is wrong.