Chamath’s prediction matches what has actually happened.

1. SEC has repeatedly refused to treat DAOs as a special, oversight‑free structure
In its foundational 2017 “DAO Report,” the SEC held that tokens issued by The DAO were securities and emphasized that offers and sales by “virtual organizations” are subject to federal securities laws, explicitly warning that the “innovative technology” does not exempt such offerings or platforms from the existing regulatory framework and that Regulation Crowdfunding did not apply because the DAO wasn’t a registered broker‑dealer or funding portal. (sec.gov) Subsequent guidance and academic/compliance analyses of DAOs continue to treat them under the Howey test, stressing that DAO tokens that are securities must either be registered or forced into narrow exemptions with resale and distribution limits, rather than enjoying any carve‑out as a new structure. (corpgov.law.harvard.edu)

2. Enforcement posture: DAOs treated as entities to be policed, not privileged
When the first Wyoming‑chartered DAO, American CryptoFed DAO, tried to register its tokens (aimed at broad distribution) with the SEC, the agency halted the registration, alleging the filings were materially deficient and misleading, and then initiated proceedings to issue a stop order. (sec.gov) An ALJ issued an initial decision against the registration, and the Commission has kept the matter alive through 2024–2025 with repeated orders extending time to issue a final decision, rather than allowing the DAO to proceed. (sec.gov) Commentators describe this as an example of “severe SEC scrutiny” that effectively shut down Wyoming’s first authorized DAO, underscoring that federal regulators did not embrace a DAO structure even when a state tried to. (mondaq.com)

The CFTC has taken a similarly hard line. In the Ooki DAO case, it sued the DAO as an unincorporated association, won a default judgment, had the court declare the DAO a “person” under the Commodity Exchange Act, imposed a civil penalty, and ordered the website shut down. (cftc.gov) The CFTC’s enforcement director explicitly framed this as a “wake‑up call” to anyone who thinks adopting a DAO structure can evade regulatory accountability. (cftc.gov) That is the opposite of endorsing DAOs as a favored structure for retail investing.

3. No federal move to make DAOs a primary retail-investment channel
As of late 2025, there is still no dedicated federal regime granting DAOs special status as retail investment vehicles. Overviews of U.S. blockchain regulation note that DAOs and smart contracts are not specifically regulated at the federal level; instead, the SEC and CFTC have acted against DAOs that issue securities or financial products without proper registration, and even state‑recognized DAOs in Wyoming or Utah must still comply with federal law. (metlabs.io) Proposed legislation like the Lummis‑Gillibrand Responsible Financial Innovation Act would treat DAOs as business entities for tax and regulatory purposes, but it has not been enacted and does not turn DAOs into a privileged, low‑oversight channel for broad retail participation in private investments. (mayerbrown.com)

4. Ongoing industry complaints confirm regulators have not become supportive
In 2025, crypto policy groups like the DeFi Education Fund and the Uniswap Foundation are still publicly urging the SEC to “back off” from regulating most DAOs, arguing that applying Howey and securities regulation is inappropriate. (medium.com) The fact that this lobbying is even necessary—years after ConstitutionDAO and the podcast episode—strongly indicates regulators have not pivoted to a supportive stance that would let DAOs become a primary, lightly regulated retail investment mechanism.

Putting this together: U.S. regulators have consistently insisted that DAOs fit within existing oversight (securities and commodities laws), brought high‑profile enforcement cases against DAOs, blocked or slow‑rolled DAO token registrations, and declined to create a special, permissive regime for retail DAO investing. That behavior aligns closely with Chamath’s claim that the SEC and other regulators would not be supportive of DAOs as a primary mechanism for broad retail participation in private investments, because endorsing DAOs in that way would undermine their established oversight regime.