As of November 30, 2025, only a few years have passed since the August 2022 prediction, while the claim explicitly concerns what will happen “over the coming decades.” That makes it too early to determine whether voluntary carbon markets and direct air capture (DAC) will remain marginal or whether they will eventually scale.

On the voluntary/offset carbon market side, developments so far largely validate Chamath’s skepticism about it becoming a central climate solution:

• A major investigation found that about 78–80% of the world’s 50 largest offset projects were “likely junk or worthless,” due to fundamental failings in how their climate benefits were calculated. (theguardian.com)
• A confidential draft assessment for the UN‑linked Science Based Targets initiative concluded that most carbon offsets are largely ineffective at delivering real emissions reductions. (reuters.com)
• The value of the voluntary carbon market fell sharply, dropping around 61% from about $1.9 billion in 2022 to roughly $723 million in 2023, amid a widely described “crisis of confidence” about offset integrity. (ecowatch.com)
• Some large corporates (e.g., Fortescue) have publicly walked away from voluntary offsets as a core decarbonization tool, and regulators (such as the EU) are tightening rules on using offsets in “carbon neutral” claims. (theaustralian.com.au)

However, carbon trading as a whole is not dying: compliance and mixed markets are very large (hundreds of billions of dollars in 2024) and projected to grow, with the voluntary segment only a small part of a much bigger global carbon‐credits system. (globalgrowthinsights.com) This suggests the specific voluntary offset boom has under‑delivered relative to hype, but long‑term structural outcomes are still unsettled.

On the direct air capture side, the picture is more mixed than the “toy projects” language suggests:

• DAC capacity today is tiny: the IEA reports only 27 DAC plants commissioned worldwide, mostly small pilot or demonstration facilities, with just three capturing ≥1,000 tonnes of CO₂ per year. Two larger plants—36,000 t/yr in Iceland and ~500,000 t/yr in the U.S.—are only now coming online. (iea.org) DAC and other carbon‑capture projects together still remove only a fraction of a percent of global CO₂ emissions. (apnews.com)
• At the same time, there is clear evidence that governments and large companies are treating DAC as a serious, potentially commercial industry rather than a side “toy”:
  • Occidental’s 1PointFive is building STRATOS, a 500,000‑tonne‑per‑year DAC plant in Texas, with EPA Class VI storage permits and commercial start‑up targeted for 2025, supported by large tax credits and federal funding. (industrialinfo.com)
  • The U.S. Department of Energy has created multi‑billion‑dollar regional DAC hub programs and follow‑on funding rounds to support mid‑ and large‑scale plants. (energy.gov)
  • Climeworks has raised substantial capital, launched its Mammoth plant (up to 36,000 t/yr), signed large multi‑year removal contracts with blue‑chip corporates, and received DOE support to build large DAC facilities in the U.S., all while publicly targeting megaton‑ and then gigaton‑scale operations by mid‑century. (time.com)
  • Other firms like Avnos have attracted strategic project financing from Shell and Mitsubishi to build commercial DAC demonstration plants, indicating continuing investor interest beyond mere pilot “science experiments.” (axios.com)

In summary:

• Directionally, part of Chamath’s view is supported so far: voluntary offset markets have not become the dominant, trusted climate solution and are undergoing a strong backlash and restructuring.
• But DAC is clearly beyond a "toy" stage in terms of capital commitment and industrial plans, even though it remains minuscule and uneconomic at climate‑relevant scale today.
• Crucially, the prediction is about what will happen over decades. With only about three years of data since the podcast, and DAC just entering its first wave of large plants, we cannot yet say whether DAC will either stall out as marginal or mature into a mainstream, economically robust sector.

Because the core claim is explicitly long‑term and current evidence points in both directions (offsets underperforming hype, DAC still tiny but rapidly capitalized and policy‑supported), the only defensible judgment at this point is “inconclusive (too early)” rather than clearly right or wrong.