when these public companies do that, the stock market and investors, by and large will realize, wow, this is a much bigger problem than 2008.
In the 1–2 quarters after March 2020, investors did not treat COVID-19 as a stock‑market problem “much bigger than 2008.” While the real‑economy shock was indeed projected to be worse than the Global Financial Crisis — the IMF’s April 2020 World Economic Outlook described the “Great Lockdown” as the worst recession since the Great Depression and much worse than the 2008–09 financial crisis in terms of global GDP contraction (imf.org) — equity investors quickly looked through it.
Market behavior shows this clearly. During the 2007–09 crisis, the S&P 500 fell about 57% from peak to trough over a 17‑month bear market (en.wikipedia.org). In contrast, in 2020 the S&P 500 dropped roughly 34% from its February 19 high to the March 23 low, and that bear market lasted just 33 days — the shortest on record (en.wikipedia.org). By August 18, 2020, the S&P 500 had already recovered to a new all‑time high, formally ending that record‑short bear market and signaling renewed optimism despite the pandemic’s toll (investing.com). By year‑end 2020, the S&P 500 and Dow were again at record levels, with the S&P up more than 60% from its March low, a rebound widely attributed to aggressive fiscal and monetary support and expectations of recovery (investing.com).
Earnings data from the first two reporting seasons after March 2020 also undercut the idea that investors concluded COVID‑19 was much worse than 2008 in market terms. FactSet reported that S&P 500 earnings were on track for about a 42–44% year‑over‑year decline in Q2 2020, which would be the largest drop since Q4 2008’s roughly 69% plunge — i.e., still less severe than the worst quarter of the financial crisis (insight.factset.com). Yet forward P/E multiples in April–July 2020 were above their 5‑ and 10‑year averages, indicating investors were willing to pay higher valuations despite the earnings collapse, effectively betting on a rapid normalization rather than a crisis worse than 2008 (insight.factset.com).
Overall, macroeconomic institutions did label the COVID recession deeper than 2008, but the stock market and investors — as reflected in price action, bear‑market depth and duration, and valuation behavior in the ensuing 1–2 quarters — did not broadly conclude it was a much bigger market problem than the 2008 financial crisis. That makes Chamath’s prediction, as stated, wrong.