Chamath’s statement is explicitly conditional: market reactions if a Russia–Ukraine–related nuclear incident occurred three months earlier, at the time of the podcast (Oct 2022), and three months later (around Jan 2023). The core event he posits — an actual nuclear incident (use of a nuclear weapon or a radiological/nuclear accident) tied to the war — has not happened.

Multiple overviews of the war and of nuclear risk around it note that, despite extensive nuclear threats and saber‑rattling, no nuclear weapons have been used in Ukraine as of 2025. (nationalsecurityjournal.org) The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant has been under occupation and repeatedly shelled, creating an ongoing nuclear safety crisis, but international monitoring and IAEA statements emphasize that the world has so far been “lucky that a nuclear accident hasn’t happened” there – i.e., no major radiological release or accident has occurred. (en.wikipedia.org) Broader surveys of “nuclear risk during the Russo‑Ukrainian war” likewise describe threats and fears rather than any realized nuclear incident. (en.wikipedia.org)

Because the prerequisite event in his prediction (a clear nuclear incident) never occurred in the specified window or since, there is no actual market reaction to observe and compare across his three time points (three months before, at the time of speaking, and three months after). Any judgment about how markets would have reacted remains hypothetical and model‑dependent rather than empirically testable. For that reason, the accuracy of his prediction about relative market reactions cannot be determined from real‑world data and must be classified as ambiguous rather than right, wrong, or merely too early to tell.