Chamath’s claim has two parts: (1) the world will experience persistently higher inflation and non‑zero (elevated) interest rates for 10–20 years, and (2) that regime will prevent a lot of wars over that horizon because it makes financing large conflicts harder.

So far, the macro environment is broadly consistent with the first part in the short run. Since late 2021, central banks have raised policy rates by hundreds of basis points, and the IMF and others explicitly describe a “higher‑for‑longer” rate environment as they battle still‑elevated inflation.

• IMF and BIS commentary from 2023 onward stress that policy rates in advanced and emerging economies have been lifted sharply, and may need to stay high for an extended period to tame inflation. (meetings.imf.org)
• The World Bank/IMF and private economists repeatedly frame the post‑COVID regime as a break from the zero‑rate 2010s, with expectations that nominal rates will not return to near‑zero quickly. (cnbc.com)
• At the same time, global inflation is projected to gradually fall toward mid‑single digits by the mid‑2020s rather than stay at the 2021–22 peaks, implying somewhat elevated but not runaway inflation. (reuters.com)

However, the war / conflict side of the prediction is, so far, moving in the opposite direction of his thesis, at least in the early years:

• The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and PRIO report that 2023 and 2024 saw record numbers of state‑based armed conflicts since their dataset began in 1946: 59 such conflicts in 2023 and 61 in 2024, with eleven reaching the level of “war” (≥1,000 battle‑related deaths per year). (uu.se)
• Major wars since his October 2022 statement include the continuing Russian invasion of Ukraine and the large‑scale Israel–Hamas war beginning October 2023, plus extremely deadly conflicts in Sudan and elsewhere, contributing to some of the bloodiest years since the end of the Cold War and very high civilian casualties from explosive weapons. (prio.org)

Despite this adverse early evidence, the prediction is explicitly about “the next 10 or 20 years” from 2022—i.e., roughly 2022–2032/2042. As of late 2025, we are only about three years into that window. Whether higher, non‑zero rates materially reduce the total incidence of new wars versus the prior low‑rate era is a long‑horizon, counterfactual claim that cannot yet be empirically judged.

Because:

• The specified minimum time horizon (10 years) has not elapsed, and
• The claim is comparative and causal ("prevent a lot of wars" vs. what would have happened under low rates), which requires more years of data and careful modeling,

the fairest classification today is “inconclusive (too early)”—even though current conflict data to date do not support the mechanism he proposed.