The core prediction was conditional: if the U.S. passed a streamlined permitting framework for hydrocarbon projects tied to the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), then that reform would unleash major fossil-fuel revenues and improve U.S. national security.

1. The specific "framework" tied to the IRA was never enacted.
   • As part of the IRA deal, Democratic leaders promised Sen. Joe Manchin a later vote on comprehensive permitting reform, which he introduced as the Energy Independence and Security Act / Building American Energy Security Act of 2022 and tried to attach to must‑pass bills. (energy.senate.gov)
   • Those permitting packages, which would have created broader, faster permitting for major energy projects (including fossil fuels), were removed from a September 2022 continuing resolution and then failed a cloture vote in December 2022 (47–47), ending that effort for the year. (publicpower.org)
   • A later, more comprehensive bipartisan bill, the Energy Permitting Reform Act of 2024 (EPRA), cleared the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee but was never enacted; Manchin later blamed House leadership for blocking inclusion of this bipartisan compromise in a 2024 funding deal. (en.wikipedia.org)
   In other words, the broad, durable permitting framework Manchin and IRA negotiators originally envisioned has not become law.

2. Some partial permitting reforms did pass, but they are narrower and not clearly Chamath’s “framework.”
   • The Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 (debt‑ceiling deal) included limited National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) reforms—time and page limits for environmental reviews and a designation of a lead agency—and a special fast‑track for the Mountain Valley Pipeline. (aga.org)
   • These are real changes to permitting but fall well short of the sweeping, IRA‑adjacent permitting framework that was being discussed in mid‑2022 for a broad set of hydrocarbon projects. So it’s debatable whether the antecedent of Chamath’s conditional (“if we actually pass this framework…”) was ever satisfied in the sense he meant.

3. U.S. fossil‑fuel production and export revenues have surged, but causality is unclear.
   • U.S. crude oil production set new all‑time records in 2023 and 2024 (about 12.9–13.3 million barrels/day), and is projected to remain at or above ~13.5 million barrels/day in 2025–26. (forbes.com)
   • U.S. natural‑gas output and LNG exports also reached record levels; the U.S. has become the world’s leading LNG exporter, with 2023 gas exports up about 10% from 2022 and LNG volumes at record highs. (eia.gov)
   These trends clearly represent large fossil‑fuel revenues, but they reflect a mix of factors: prior investment, shale technology, post‑COVID demand, the Russia‑Ukraine war, and commodity prices. The incremental impact of the limited post‑IRA permitting tweaks (mainly NEPA timeline rules and MVP approvals) on total national fossil‑fuel revenues is not cleanly isolatable from these other drivers.

4. "Improved national security" is inherently subjective and politically contested.
   • Many U.S. officials and commentators argue that high domestic production and expanded LNG exports enhance both U.S. and allied energy security by reducing reliance on adversaries (e.g., Russia), and recent LNG supply agreements with European and Asian partners are explicitly framed in security terms. (forbes.com)
   • At the same time, others argue that climate and economic risks from further fossil expansion undermine long‑term security. There is no objective, widely agreed metric that would let us definitively score “national security improved because of this specific permitting framework,” especially given that the expected comprehensive framework never fully passed.

Why this is rated “ambiguous” rather than right or wrong:

• The prediction is explicitly conditional: it only becomes testable if the U.S. passes the kind of broad hydrocarbon‑permitting framework that was being negotiated with the IRA. That comprehensive framework has not been enacted; only narrower reforms have.
• Although fossil‑fuel revenues and exports have indeed grown and many policymakers link energy abundance to national security, these outcomes cannot be cleanly attributed to the specific permitting reforms Chamath was talking about, because that reform package never truly materialized.
• Sufficient time has passed to observe policy impacts, but the underlying condition was not met in the way described, and the causal link to the observable outcomes is too uncertain.

Given these factors, the truth of Chamath’s conditional claim (“if X passes, Y will happen”) cannot be determined from real‑world developments to date, even though enough time has elapsed—hence the classification as ambiguous.