Chamath’s claim was that global oil production capacity could not materially expand from “roughly current levels” until around 2028–2030, i.e., there was “very little room” to grow supply before then.

Evidence since 2022 shows both realized production and nameplate capacity have already increased materially well before 2028, driven largely by non‑OPEC producers:

• The IEA’s Oil 2023 medium‑term outlook, based on projects already underway and U.S. shale expectations, projected 5.9 million barrels per day (mb/d) of net additional production capacity being brought online over 2022–2028, led by the U.S., Brazil and Guyana. This explicitly contradicts the idea that new capacity could not arrive until 2028–2030. (iea.org)
• IEA Oil Market Reports show global oil supply at record levels: total supply is on track to reach about 103 mb/d in 2024, with non‑OPEC+ output rising ~1.5–1.6 mb/d year‑on‑year, primarily from the U.S., Brazil, Guyana and Canada. (iea.org) This is a multi‑million‑barrel‑per‑day increase versus 2022 levels, indicating that global productive capacity has in fact expanded.
• U.S. EIA analyses estimate world petroleum and other liquids supply rose ~0.6 mb/d in 2024 and is forecast to rise another 1.9 mb/d in 2025 and 1.6 mb/d in 2026, driven by higher output from the U.S., Canada, Brazil and Guyana. (ajot.com) These sustained increases are only possible because new capacity is coming online well before 2028.
• Guyana’s offshore Stabroek block alone has become a major new source of capacity: Exxon and partners reached 900,000 bpd of production capacity by 2025 after the early startup of the Yellowtail FPSO, and the sanctioned project slate targets around 1.3 mb/d by 2027 and 1.7 mb/d by 2030. (corporate.exxonmobil.com) This is a large, concrete addition to global capacity delivered years before 2028.
• Brazil’s pre‑salt developments have also added significant new supply: Brazilian oil output averaged 3.4 mb/d in 2023, up 12.6% from 2022, with the increase coming mainly from high‑productivity offshore pre‑salt fields. (trade.gov)
• Separately, EIA estimates that OPEC+ surplus crude production capacity was about 4.6 mb/d in 2024, more than double 2019, showing there is substantial existing room to expand output—contrary to the claim that there was “very little room” to do so. (energi.media)

Even though the calendar has not yet reached 2028–2030, the falsifiable part of Chamath’s prediction was that material additional capacity could not be added before then. Actual developments—multiple mb/d of new capacity from U.S. shale, Brazil, Guyana and others, plus rising spare capacity—show that this constraint did not hold. On that basis, the prediction is wrong.