Evidence from July 2024 through mid‑2025 supports Chamath’s core claim that the post‑election National Assembly was so fragmented that neither Marine Le Pen’s far‑right National Rally (RN) nor Jean‑Luc Mélenchon’s New Popular Front (NFP) could push through their major reform agendas, and that France endured extended political logjam.

Key points:

• The June–July 2024 snap legislative election produced a hung parliament split into three hostile blocs (NFP, Macron’s centrist Ensemble, and RN), with none close to a majority. This fragmentation led to a prolonged political crisis and a succession of weak minority governments.(en.wikipedia.org)

• Michel Barnier’s government fell in December 2024 after using Article 49.3 on a social‑financing bill; parliament then passed an emergency law simply rolling over the previous year’s budget with no policy changes, underscoring the inability to agree on substantive legislation.(en.wikipedia.org)

• François Bayrou’s successor government only managed to get a 2025 budget in place in early 2025, relying on constitutional shortcuts and a tenuous non‑aggression pact. That budget focused on deficit reduction via large spending cuts and tax increases, not on implementing RN’s hard‑line immigration program or the NFP’s expansive left‑wing economic platform (retirement at 60, big minimum‑wage hike, price freezes, wealth‑tax overhaul, etc.), which remained largely aspirational.(reuters.com)

• Throughout 2024–25, international and French press repeatedly described France as being in political deadlock, with a parliament that is “hard to govern” and governments that struggle or fail to secure majorities for their agendas, especially on reforms beyond the bare‑minimum budgetary measures demanded by fiscal pressures.(euronews.com)

• Only in late 2025—more than a year after the elections—did the Assembly manage a notable policy shift on a headline issue (temporarily suspending the 2023 pension reform), and even that fell short of the NFP’s goal of full repeal and a new retirement age of 60.(apnews.com)

Taken together, this shows: (1) the Assembly was indeed highly fragmented; (2) neither Le Pen’s nor Mélenchon’s flagship reform programs were enacted; and (3) for roughly the first year after the election, lawmaking was dominated by crisis management and stop‑gap or fiscally driven budget measures rather than transformative reforms. While one can argue that passing an austerity budget is itself a significant policy move, the spirit of Chamath’s prediction—that France would lose about a year of real reform to political logjam—matches what actually happened, so the prediction is best judged as right overall.