Evidence since October 7, 2023 shows that the Hamas attacks and Israel’s response have significantly derailed the trajectory of Arab–Israeli normalization, even though the Abraham Accords have not formally collapsed.

• Saudi–Israel track: Before October 7, U.S.-mediated talks between Israel and Saudi Arabia were widely reported as making substantial progress. After the Hamas attack and ensuing Gaza war, reporting describes the normalization effort as derailed; Riyadh hardened its stance, insisting on a ceasefire and concrete steps toward a Palestinian state as preconditions for normalization, while the current Israeli leadership rejects such steps, leaving talks effectively frozen. (timesofisrael.com) This is a direct reversal of the pre‑war momentum and fits Chamath’s concern that things would “go off the rails,” especially since Saudi normalization was the flagship next step of the Abraham Accords strategy.

• Strain and partial rollback among existing Abraham Accords states:
  – Bahrain recalled its ambassador in November 2023 and the Israeli ambassador left Bahrain; subsequent reporting notes a decline in economic/defense engagement and, in 2025, Israeli defense firms were excluded from the Dubai Airshow, seen by analysts as reflecting a political cooling and frayed ties between the UAE and Israel after the Gaza war. (en.wikipedia.org)
  – Analyses of the Accords five years on describe them as “degraded,” under “severe strain,” with people‑to‑people contacts and public enthusiasm in the UAE and Bahrain having largely evaporated after Israel’s onslaught in Gaza, even as governments keep the formal agreements for strategic reasons. (time.com) This is consistent with significant derailment of the earlier rapid-deepening phase.

• Continued but fragile formal ties: The UAE has kept diplomatic relations and even enabled humanitarian initiatives in Gaza, but has repeatedly warned that annexation or further Israeli actions could cross “red lines” and “severely undermine” normalization, and it has already imposed visible limits (e.g., barring Israeli defense firms from major events). (en.wikipedia.org) These moves underscore that the relationship is now contested and fragile rather than steadily advancing.

• Limited new ‘progress’ doesn’t negate the derailment: In 2025, Kazakhstan agreed to symbolically join the Abraham Accords, which boosts the framework’s prestige but builds on long‑standing diplomatic ties dating back to 1992 and is framed largely as a symbolic gesture occurring despite global criticism over Gaza. (apnews.com) Meanwhile, key expansion targets like Saudi Arabia have not normalized, and senior U.S. officials describe additional Arab normalization as aspirational and contingent on resolving the Gaza war and the Palestinian question—conditions not present pre‑October 7. (news.allianceglobal.org)

Taken together, the flagship near‑term expansion (a Saudi deal) has been knocked off course, relations with existing Arab partners have cooled and in some cases been partially rolled back at the diplomatic and societal levels, and the overall momentum of normalization has clearly shifted from rapid progress to a strained holding pattern. That outcome matches Chamath’s prediction that the October 7 attacks and Israel’s response would cause the Abraham Accords “normalization” process to go off the rails, so the prediction is best assessed as right.