Assessment through 29 Nov 2025
Chamath’s claim was that under the then‑existing U.S. antitrust framework, big tech platforms (Facebook/Meta, Google, Apple, Amazon) would not be broken up, and would instead mostly face regulatory/oversight regimes rather than structural divestitures. As of late 2025, that is what has happened.

1. No structural breakups of the major platforms in the U.S.

• Meta (Facebook): The FTC’s case explicitly sought divestitures of Instagram and WhatsApp. In November 2025, Judge James Boasberg ruled that Meta is not an illegal monopoly and rejected the FTC’s attempt to force a breakup, dismissing the divestiture effort.(washingtonpost.com) No court‑ordered breakup has occurred.
• Google (Alphabet): In the DOJ’s search antitrust case, a federal judge found Google liable and then moved to the remedies phase. In September 2025, the court explicitly declined to break up Google’s search business; instead, it ordered behavioral remedies (ending exclusive default search deals, limits on tying Search/Chrome/Assistant/Gemini, data‑sharing and non‑discriminatory syndication obligations), i.e., ongoing regulatory oversight rather than structural separation.(techcrunch.com)
• Amazon: The FTC’s broad antitrust suit against Amazon, filed in 2023, is still pre‑trial; a joint filing indicates trial is not expected until at least mid‑2026, so no breakup order exists.(retaildive.com) Other enforcement (e.g., a large 2025 Prime enrollment/cancellation settlement) has taken the form of monetary relief and conduct changes, not structural remedies.(the-sun.com)
• Apple: The DOJ and multiple state AGs sued Apple in March 2024 over alleged smartphone monopolization. In 2025, the court denied Apple’s motion to dismiss, allowing the case to proceed, but the litigation is still in early stages and no liability or breakup order has been issued.(michigan.gov)

Across all four firms, there has been no court‑mandated spin‑off or breakup compelled under existing U.S. antitrust statutes as of November 2025.

2. Strong shift toward regulatory and behavioral regimes

While breakups have not materialized, these companies are increasingly subject to regulatory‑style rules and oversight, especially abroad but also via U.S. conduct remedies:

• The EU Digital Markets Act (DMA) has designated Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, and Meta as “gatekeepers,” imposing detailed obligations on app stores, self‑preferencing, data‑combining, interoperability, and pre‑installation, with ongoing compliance reporting and potential fines up to 10% of global turnover.(digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu) Enforcement has already produced non‑compliance investigations and substantial fines for Apple and Meta in 2025, requiring changes to App Store rules and consent models.(digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu)
• In the U.S., the Google search case remedy package focuses on behavioral changes and monitoring (barring exclusivity deals, mandating data access and fair dealing with rivals) rather than structural breakup.(techcrunch.com) Similar patterns—injunctive relief, conduct constraints, and long‑running oversight—define current and prospective remedies against Apple and Amazon as described by DOJ/FTC filings and commentary.(cnbc.com)

3. Alignment with the prediction

Chamath argued in mid‑2020 that, given the antitrust framework at the time, big‑tech platforms would likely avoid being broken up, and that the real pressure would come from more regulation/oversight rather than structural antitrust remedies. More than five years later:

• No major U.S. court or agency has forced Facebook/Meta, Google, Apple, or Amazon to divest core businesses.
• The most significant developments have been new regulatory regimes and behavioral remedies, particularly in the EU (DMA) and in U.S. antitrust cases, which focus on rules, constraints, and supervision rather than dismantling the firms.

Future cases (especially against Apple and Amazon) could still, in theory, produce structural remedies, but judging by outcomes to date—especially Meta’s win against an attempted breakup and Google’s avoidance of structural separation—Chamath’s prediction has been accurate so far.

Conclusion: The prediction has come true to date: big tech platforms have not been broken up under existing U.S. antitrust statutes and have primarily faced regulatory and behavioral constraints instead.