How the prediction was framed
Chamath argued in mid‑2020 that if Big Tech M&A was effectively “off the table” due to antitrust, then:

1. Large‑cap tech companies would no longer reliably buy late‑stage startups at a ~2× premium to the last round.
2. As a result, late‑stage private tech valuations would go “way down” relative to the 2010s, since investors could no longer underwrite that strategic M&A markup.

To evaluate this, we need to check (a) whether Big Tech M&A really became effectively impossible, and (b) how late‑stage valuations in 2022‑2024 compare to the 2010s.

1. Big Tech M&A did not go “off the table”

Regulatory pressure and antitrust enforcement did increase meaningfully after 2020:

• US and EU authorities brought major antitrust cases against Google, Meta, Apple and others, and blocked or forced abandonment of some large deals such as Nvidia–ARM and Adobe–Figma.(en.wikipedia.org)
• Microsoft’s acquisition of Activision Blizzard faced intense global scrutiny and delay, but ultimately closed in October 2023.(en.wikipedia.org)
• Regulatory scrutiny contributed to a sharp slowdown in mega‑cap tech acquisitions: the six biggest tech companies (Apple, Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, NVIDIA, Meta) made only 9 acquisitions in 2023 vs. 33 in 2022, and overall tech mega‑deals (> $10B) fell sharply.(cooleyma.com)

However, “off the table” is much stronger than “slowed”:

• An NGO study finds Big Tech firms (Apple, Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, Meta) acquired at least 191 companies between 2019 and 2025, averaging a new acquisition roughly every 11 days, even though deal counts fell after 2022.(somo.nl)
• Big tech still executed or announced large strategic deals: Amazon–MGM (content), Amazon–One Medical (healthcare), Microsoft–Activision (gaming), and Alphabet’s planned $32B acquisition of Wiz (cloud security), among others.(helprange.com)

So while enforcement clearly chilled some big transactions and reduced volumes, M&A was not functionally eliminated as an exit path for startups. The prediction’s key precondition (“M&A off the table”) did not fully materialize.

2. Late‑stage private valuations vs. the 2010s

Chamath’s quantitative claim was that late‑stage private valuations would go “way down” once this clampdown took effect, relative to the 2010s era when investors underwrote 2× strategic exits.

What actually happened:

1. Huge boom first (2020–2021):

   • Late‑stage VC valuations surged to record highs in 2020–2021, far above 2010s levels, despite antitrust talk already intensifying. PitchBook’s US VC data show average late‑stage pre‑money valuations jumping from about $134–154M in 2018–2019 to $170M in 2020 and then ~$339M in 2021.(scribd.com)

2. Correction from peak (2022–2023):

   • Rising interest rates, public‑market tech sell‑offs and a shut IPO window led to a sharp markdown in late‑stage deals in 2022–2023. Median Series D/E valuations on Carta fell 55–80% year‑over‑year at the trough in Q1 2023.(carta.com)
   • PitchBook’s 2023 US VC Valuations report notes that late‑stage median valuations fell and step‑up multiples compressed, but the 2023 annual median late‑stage pre‑money valuation was still the third‑highest of the last decade, i.e., above most 2010s years.(scribd.com)
   • A Q4‑2023 summary based on PitchBook data says explicitly: late‑stage valuations in 2023 fell to a six‑year low, meaning roughly back to ~2017 levels—not structurally below the 2010s baseline.(pilot.com)

3. Still not ‘way down’ vs 2010s baseline:

   • The same PitchBook time series shows average US late‑stage VC pre‑money valuations by year: roughly $100–154M in 2014–2019, versus $214.7M in 2023 and $150.9M in early 2024.(scribd.com)
   • So even after the correction, late‑stage valuations have been similar to or higher than late‑2010s levels; they are certainly not “way down” relative to the 2010s. The main change is that they are down from the extraordinary 2021 bubble, not from the pre‑2020 regime he was referencing.

There is evidence that venture‑backed tech M&A exit prices in 2023 were often below the last private round (median exits ~30% below prior funding rounds), reflecting stress at late stage.(cooleyma.com) But that’s a cyclical compression from bubble highs rather than a structural reset to levels meaningfully below the 2010s.

3. Causality vs. Chamath’s thesis

Chamath’s mechanism was: antitrust → Big Tech can’t buy → no 2× strategic exits → investors slash late‑stage valuations.

The data and deal history suggest a different story:

• M&A was constrained but not eliminated; Big Tech still does acquisitions and has even announced new multi‑billion‑dollar startup deals in 2024–2025.(somo.nl)
• The sharp valuation reset tracks macro factors (interest‑rate hikes, public tech multiple compression, IPO freeze) at least as closely as it tracks M&A antitrust. Reports from CB Insights, PitchBook, and Carta all emphasize rates, public comps, and liquidity as primary drivers of the 2022–2023 pullback.(cbinsights.com)
• And even after that pullback, late‑stage valuations remain around or above their late‑2010s range, not materially below it.

Conclusion

Because:

• Big Tech M&A was slowed but far from “off the table,” and
• Late‑stage private valuations, while down sharply from 2021 bubble highs, have not gone “way down” relative to 2010s levels and in 2023 were still among the highest years of the decade,

Chamath’s prediction about a structural, antitrust‑driven collapse in late‑stage private tech valuations (relative to the 2010s) has not come true.

Verdict: wrong.