So far, the interest-rate condition of Chamath’s prediction has largely been met, but the governance outcome he forecast is not clearly borne out yet, and the 4–5 year window he specified has not fully elapsed.

1. Rates have been in the 3–5%+ zone for most of the window so far. After his October 2022 comment, the Fed funds rate rose from ~3–4% to 5.25–5.50% in 2023 and then was cut to the 4–4.5% range by late 2024–2025, remaining far above the zero-rate era he was contrasting with and broadly within/around his “3–5%” band.(en.wikipedia.org)

2. Dual‑/multi‑class and supervoting IPOs have continued in this higher‑rate regime.

   • The Council of Institutional Investors notes that dual‑class structures already made up ~24–25% of US IPOs by 2021, and that the proportion of IPOs with differential voting shares has risen since 2019 rather than fallen.(cii.org)
   • A 2024 analysis finds that, by 2024, the share of US IPOs with dual share classes had roughly tripled to about 30% versus a 40‑year average of 10%, indicating the structure is still widely used despite higher rates.(etoro.com)

3. Recent high‑profile IPOs show strong founder/control structures still getting done. Examples since 2023 include:

   • ODDITY Tech (2023): IPO with Class A (1 vote) and Class B (10 votes) shares; post‑IPO, Class B represents ~72% of voting power and the CEO alone holds ~76% of total voting power.(sec.gov)
   • Reddit (2024): Three‑class structure (A: 1 vote, B: 10 votes, C: no votes). After the IPO, Class B holders control ~97% of voting power, and CEO Steve Huffman controls about three‑quarters of total voting power via voting agreements, qualifying Reddit as a NYSE “controlled company.”(sec.gov)
   • Figure Technology Solutions (2025): Dual‑class structure where founder Michael Cagney retains voting control via 10‑vote Class B shares.(reddit.com) These are exactly the sort of aggressive founder‑control/supervoting IPOs Chamath suggested would be checked by investor alternatives in a 4–5% rate world, yet they have been underwritten and completed.

4. There is growing investor pushback, but it hasn’t clearly translated into “meaningful resistance” that stops such IPOs.

   • Large institutions and groups like CII and the Investor Coalition for Equal Votes have intensified campaigns against perpetual dual‑class structures and pushed for time‑based sunsets.(cii.org)
   • However, empirical tracking by CII and others shows the prevalence of dual‑class IPOs has stayed elevated or increased; there is no clear drop in use that could confidently be attributed to higher rates acting as a binding “check.”(cii.org)

5. The forecast horizon is not over, and key IPO candidates haven’t tested the claim yet. Chamath spoke of the “next 4 or 5 years” from late 2022; as of November 2025 we are only about three years in. Several of the most important governance test cases (e.g., Stripe, Databricks and other late‑stage unicorns) have not yet IPO’d, so we don’t know whether they will be forced to moderate control structures at the point of going public.(en.wikipedia.org)

Because:

• the rate condition has mostly held,
• aggressive founder‑control IPOs are still being executed (suggesting his “that dog doesn’t hunt” claim is not clearly correct so far), but
• the 4–5 year evaluation window has not finished and many pivotal IPOs are still ahead,

it is premature to definitively score the prediction as right or wrong. The evidence to date leans against his thesis that higher rates alone would significantly curtail governance overreach in IPOs, but not strongly enough, nor over a long enough period, to move beyond an inconclusive (too early) judgment.