Chamath’s prediction was made on July 9, 2023, in All-In Podcast E136, where he said: “in the next five to six years, five to ten years, we’re not going to be talking about China the same way we are today.”(podscripts.co) This explicitly sets a resolution window of roughly July 2028–July 2033.

As of the current date (November 30, 2025), we are only a bit more than two years into that 5–10 year window. The earliest point at which the prediction could be fairly evaluated (around mid‑2028) has not yet arrived, so it is too early to determine whether U.S. discourse will, by then, have become notably less focused on China as a central adversarial threat.

Current indicators actually show that U.S. political and strategic rhetoric remains strongly centered on China as a primary competitor and security challenge—for example:

• Official U.S. defense strategy documents and commissions continue to describe China as the “pacing challenge” and the preeminent military and strategic threat.(debateus.org)
• Congress maintains a dedicated House Select Committee on Strategic Competition with the Chinese Communist Party, created in 2023 and still active, whose purpose is explicitly to address economic, technological, and security competition with China.(en.wikipedia.org)
• Analyses of U.S.–China relations characterize U.S. policy since 2017 as a sustained, comprehensive strategy of strategic competition with China that has persisted across administrations.(china-cee.eu)
• Public opinion polling in 2024 shows U.S. views of China at historically high unfavorable levels, reflecting an entrenched adversarial perception.(csis.org)

These facts suggest that, so far, U.S. discourse has not shifted in the way Chamath anticipated; if anything, China remains framed as a core rival. However, because the prediction is specifically about conditions 5–10 years after mid‑2023, and we have not yet reached even the start of that evaluation window, the correct judgment at this time is “inconclusive” (too early to tell).