Summary: Chamath correctly anticipated a directional shift in rhetoric and policy focus—especially in large economies—toward resilience, industrial policy, and some de‑risking from China. However, the stronger claim that most countries would swing “back towards nationalized economies and away from global economies,” with broad domesticization of food/critical goods and sharply reduced China-dependence, is not borne out by global data as of late 2025. The outcome is mixed rather than clearly right or wrong.

1. Globalization has not broadly reversed

• Global trade as a share of world GDP (“trade openness”) rebounded after the 2020 COVID dip and reached record highs by 2022 (about 63% of global GDP), exceeding pre‑pandemic levels. This indicates continued or even deepened integration rather than a sustained move away from global trade. (ourworldindata.org)
• Across 161 countries, average trade openness in 2023 was ~95% of GDP; high‑income economies averaged over 126%, showing that economies remain highly intertwined internationally rather than “nationalized.” (theglobaleconomy.com)
• The WTO’s World Trade Report 2023 and subsequent WTO commentary state that while geopolitical tensions and some fragmentation exist, evidence of de‑globalization remains “scarce” and global trade “continues to thrive.” (wto.org)
• A 2024 academic review, “Challenging the deglobalization narrative,” using the DHL Global Connectedness Index, concludes that international flows of trade, capital, information, and people have not decreased relative to domestic activity and there is no general deglobalization trend—only targeted reorientations (e.g., Russia vs. the West, partial US–China decoupling). (link.springer.com)

Taken together, the data contradict a clear global swing “away from global economies” toward nationally closed systems.

2. Strong evidence of policy moves toward resilience and self‑reliance in major economies

Where Chamath’s prediction does align with reality is in policy direction in several large economies:

• United States: Since 2020 the US has pivoted to more interventionist, security‑driven industrial policy. A package including the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, CHIPS and Science Act, and Inflation Reduction Act involves large subsidies, export controls, and investment screening, described in the literature as “interventionist techno‑nationalism” aimed at reshaping global value chains and protecting national autonomy. (link.springer.com)
• European Union: The EU Chips Act explicitly aims to reinforce Europe’s semiconductor capacity, reduce dependence on “a limited number of third country companies and geographies,” and build a resilient internal chip ecosystem. (europarl.europa.eu)
  • The Critical Raw Materials Act sets quantitative 2030 targets for domestic extraction, processing, and recycling of critical raw materials (10%, 40%, and 25% of EU consumption respectively) to strengthen “strategic autonomy” and reduce import dependence. (reneweuropegroup.eu)
• India: The Atmanirbhar Bharat (“Self‑reliant India”) framework, launched during COVID, explicitly pursues economic self‑sufficiency and reduced external reliance. Production‑Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes introduced from 2020 cover 14 sectors—electronics, pharmaceuticals, medical devices, autos, specialty steel, telecom, batteries, etc.—with large subsidies to boost domestic manufacturing and exports. (indbiz.gov.in)
  • Defense policy under Atmanirbhar Bharat has indigenised thousands of imported items, reducing reliance on foreign suppliers. (opindia.com)
• Japan and EU energy/tech: Japan’s subsidized push into next‑gen perovskite solar cells is framed as a way to challenge China’s dominance and improve energy and supply‑chain security. (ft.com) The EU’s broader “open strategic autonomy” agenda in industrial policy likewise emphasizes resilience and reduced vulnerability. (link.springer.com)
• Across advanced economies, “de‑risking,” reshoring, nearshoring, and friendshoring entered mainstream policy vocabulary as tools to enhance supply‑chain resilience and economic security post‑COVID and post‑Ukraine. (wealth-db.com)

So the direction of policy—more national focus, resilience, and selective domestic anchoring of critical sectors—is indeed visible, especially among major economies.

3. Shifts away from China are partial and slow, not clean breaks

Chamath also implied less dependence on single‑country suppliers like China. Here the evidence is mixed:

• U.S. trade data show some diversification: by 2024 Mexico had become the top exporter to the U.S., but China still accounted for about $438.9 billion of U.S. imports (13.3% of the total), making it a leading supplier despite very high tariffs and trade tensions. (wsj.com)
• A Federal Reserve analysis finds that U.S. outward FDI has shifted away from China/Hong Kong toward Mexico, India, and Europe, and there are “tentative signs” of reshoring/localization in high‑tech manufacturing “but not more broadly.” (federalreserve.gov)
• Trade composition data suggest U.S., EU, and Japan imports from China have declined in some categories, with rising imports from Mexico, ASEAN (especially Vietnam), and other partners, consistent with friendshoring and “China+1” strategies. (japanpolicyforum.jp)
• However, studies of supply‑chain reallocation show that China’s exports and participation in global value chains remain robust, increasingly through intermediate goods shipped to Asian and European partners, so that many “China+1” suppliers remain tightly tied to Chinese upstream inputs. (arxiv.org)
• Surveys and regional analyses emphasize that “just cutting off the supply chain with China is not easy – it’s almost impossible”; firms often keep production in China when it remains economically compelling, and de‑risking proceeds slowly. (asiasociety.org)
• Even Chinese and foreign commentary notes that while some low‑value production has moved, global production networks frequently still rely on China as a key link, given its cost and infrastructure advantages. (chinadaily.com.cn)

So, while there is a clear policy intent in many major economies to reduce single‑country risk—above all China—actual dependence has been reconfigured rather than sharply reduced, and remains substantial.

4. Food and critical‑goods production: some moves, but no global swing to self‑sufficiency

Chamath highlighted more domestic food and critical‑goods production:

• COVID‑19 and the Ukraine war triggered waves of export restrictions and spurred countries to reassess vulnerabilities in medical supplies, vaccines, fertilizers, energy, and some food staples. WTO and other analyses document expanded export controls on critical raw materials and strategic goods and a greater focus on supply‑chain resilience. (supplychainreport.org)
• India, for example, has linked Atmanirbhar Bharat to targets for fertilizer self‑reliance and broader domestic industrial capacity, and runs campaigns promoting “vocal for local” products. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Yet global food systems remain heavily trade‑dependent. FAO and UN food security reports highlight continued reliance on imports by many low‑income countries and focus on conflicts, climate, and economic shocks as primary drivers of hunger—not a systemic move to food autarky. (apnews.com)
• There is no strong evidence that “most countries” have significantly increased overall food self‑sufficiency; rather, many remain structurally reliant on global markets, as reflected in the persistent high levels of trade openness, especially for low‑income and small economies. (theglobaleconomy.com)

Thus, while some countries made targeted efforts in critical sectors, a broad global swing to domestically supplied food and essential goods has not occurred.

5. “Most countries” and the magnitude of the shift

Finally, the prediction uses strong language—“we’re going to swing the pendulum back towards nationalized economies and away from global economies” and emphasizes “most countries.”

• Academic and WTO evidence both stress that, at the global level, the world has not entered a deglobalization phase; instead, globalization remains high, with selective fragmentation around specific geopolitical fault lines. (link.springer.com)
• There is large cross‑country variation: a handful of big economies (US, EU, China, India, Japan) have adopted more assertive industrial and security‑oriented policies, but many middle‑ and low‑income countries lack the fiscal and institutional capacity to emulate extensive reshoring or “nationalized” strategies and remain deeply trade‑dependent. (link.springer.com)

So while some large economies have indeed shifted their policy stance toward resilience and partial re‑nationalization of key sectors, this falls short of a documented, broad global move in which “most countries” fundamentally pivot away from globalization.

Overall assessment

Correct in spirit but overstated in scope and magnitude.

Chamath accurately foresaw:

• The rise of resilience, de‑risking, and strategic autonomy as central policy themes after COVID;
• Expanded domestic and allied production in critical sectors (chips, energy, defense, some medical supplies);
• Growing concern over over‑reliance on China and other single‑country suppliers.

However, data and major analyses show that:

• Globalization has not reversed; trade openness is at or near record highs and international flows remain robust. (ourworldindata.org)
• Moves toward nationalized or self‑sufficient economies are partial and concentrated in a subset of large economies and sectors; they do not characterize “most countries.” (link.springer.com)
• Dependence on China has been reconfigured rather than sharply reduced, with enduring deep linkages in many supply chains. (arxiv.org)

Because there is substantiated movement in the forecasted direction but not at the global scale or intensity implied, the prediction cannot be cleanly labeled right or wrong. The most accurate rating is “ambiguous.”