Assessment Chamath predicted that the U.S. would respond to COVID-19 with a China‑2009–style mix of very large fiscal and monetary stimulus, which would lead to (1) significant misallocation of capital / “fake growth” and (2) high inflation in subsequent years. Looking at 2020–2024 data, both elements are borne out.

1. Very large U.S. fiscal + monetary stimulus did occur

Fiscal:

• The U.S. enacted multiple huge COVID packages: the CARES Act (~$2.2T, March 2020), the Consolidated Appropriations Act (~$900B, Dec 2020), and the American Rescue Plan (~$1.9T, March 2021), among others. Estimates of total discretionary COVID fiscal measures run to several trillion dollars, on the order of 25% of U.S. GDP when broadly counted.

Monetary:

• The Federal Reserve cut rates to near zero in March 2020 and launched massive quantitative easing, expanding its balance sheet from under $4.2T in early 2020 to almost $9T by 2022, the largest and fastest expansion in modern U.S. history.

This is consistent with the “combination of fiscal and monetary stimulus” Chamath referenced, similar in spirit to China’s 2009–2010 response.

2. High inflation in subsequent years

• U.S. CPI inflation, which had averaged around 2% pre‑COVID, surged beginning in 2021:
  • 2021: annual CPI inflation around 4.7%.
  • 2022: annual CPI inflation around 8.0%, the highest since the early 1980s.
  • Mid‑2022 year‑over‑year CPI peaked at about 9.1%.
• Major analyses from the Federal Reserve, IMF, and academic economists attribute a substantial share of this surge specifically to the large, deficit‑financed fiscal packages interacting with easy monetary policy—i.e., demand stimulated well beyond supply capacity, contributing materially to inflation (along with supply shocks, energy prices, etc.).

Thus the “massive inflation” part of the prediction clearly materialized in the years after the 2020–2021 stimulus.

3. Misallocation of capital / “fake growth”

While “fake growth” is not a precise technical term, observable signs of significant misallocation of capital and distorted financial conditions appeared after the stimulus:

• SPAC mania and speculative IPO boom (2020–2021): SPAC issuance and speculative growth IPOs exploded, then collapsed. Many deals later traded far below issue price or were liquidated, widely described as a bubble enabled by ultra‑easy money and stimulus‑driven liquidity.
• Meme‑stock and crypto bubbles: Enormous retail speculation in meme stocks (e.g., GameStop, AMC) and a massive run‑up in crypto assets, followed by sharp crashes in 2022–2023. Analysts and central‑bank commentary tied a portion of this risk‑taking to abundant liquidity and stimulus checks boosting retail trading.
• "Zombie" firms and cheap debt: Research and commentary documented an increase in highly indebted or unprofitable firms kept alive by extremely low rates and accommodative credit markets, with concern that cheap capital was flowing into low‑productivity uses rather than sustainable investment.
• Rapid reversal of growth once support and easy money faded: As rates rose sharply in 2022–2023 to fight inflation, many of these boom sectors (SPACs, profitless tech, crypto) experienced severe drawdowns, and startup/VC funding retrenched dramatically, consistent with the idea that some of the prior “growth” was largely financial‑conditions‑driven rather than fundamentally sustainable.

All of these patterns are consistent with significant capital misallocation and overstated or low‑quality growth fueled by the stimulus period.

Conclusion

• Core mechanism predicted: very large fiscal plus monetary stimulus ✔️
• Outcome 1 – high inflation in subsequent years: clearly occurred (2021–2023 inflation spike to multi‑decade highs) ✔️
• Outcome 2 – misallocation / “fake growth”: strong evidence in post‑2020 bubbles (SPACs, meme stocks, crypto, zombie firms) and subsequent busts ✔️

Given that both the macro‑inflation outcome and clear signs of capital misallocation materialized in the years after the COVID stimulus, Chamath’s prediction is best judged as right.