Summary of the prediction
Chamath argued in July 2020 that if the U.S. kept subsidizing and supporting its own energy independence:

1. Russia and the Middle East would be forced to rapidly monetize their oil.
2. This would cause them to "not [be] relevant anymore" geopolitically.
3. The Middle East would likely disintegrate into ~30 countries.
4. Russia would become significantly less important internationally because it would lose its primary revenue source.

As of late 2025, this composite prediction has not come true.

1. U.S. energy policy did not simply continue on a straight-line “independence” path

While U.S. oil and gas production remained high and even hit new records, policy has been mixed rather than a pure, ongoing ramp of subsidies toward traditional fossil-fuel “independence”:

• The U.S. became the world’s largest oil and gas producer and remained a net exporter of natural gas and, in some years, of petroleum products overall.
• At the same time, major federal policies (e.g., the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022) heavily subsidized clean energy and electrification rather than simply subsidizing fossil-fuel extraction.

So the specific conditional—continued subsidized support of traditional fossil-fuel energy independence as the main driver—only partially fits reality; the U.S. pursued a mixed model (large fossil output + aggressive clean-energy subsidies) rather than the narrow scenario implied.

2. Russia did not become less geopolitically relevant; in many ways, the opposite occurred

Key facts since 2020:

• Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 dramatically increased its centrality in global geopolitics, triggering major shifts in NATO, EU defense and energy policy, sanctions regimes, and global alignments (e.g., Russia–China, Russia–Global South).
• Despite sanctions on Russian oil and gas (price caps, embargoes, redirection of flows), Russia has continued to export large volumes of crude and products via discounted sales to countries like China and India, maintaining energy as a key revenue source rather than “losing” it.
• Energy leverage remained a core tool of Russian statecraft, particularly with Europe in 2021–2023 (e.g., gas cuts, Nord Stream issues).

Instead of Russia “becoming less important,” its actions elevated it to one of the central actors in global security and energy debates. It may be more isolated from the West, but not less geopolitically relevant; it is a focal point of great‑power confrontation.

3. The Middle East has not fragmented into ~30 countries

• As of late 2025, the map of recognized sovereign states in the Middle East remains largely unchanged. Core states such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the Gulf monarchies, etc., retain their formal territorial integrity.
• There are ongoing conflicts and de facto fragmentations (e.g., in Yemen, Syria, Libya) but these predate 2020 and did not transform into a wholesale breakup into “~30 countries.”
• In fact, several states have pursued greater regional integration and normalization, not dissolution:
  • Abraham Accords (starting 2020) between Israel and several Arab states.
  • Steps such as Saudi–Iran rapprochement brokered by China in 2023.
  • Discussions of deeper economic and security cooperation among Gulf states.

There is continued internal strain (economic, political, sectarian), but nothing close to the predicted wave of state disintegration.

4. Middle East and Russia remain central energy and geopolitical players

Contrary to the idea that they would “not [be] relevant anymore” because they are forced to monetize their oil early:

• Middle Eastern producers (especially Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar) remain core players in OPEC/OPEC+, actively managing output and prices and exercising influence over global markets and, by extension, many importing countries.
• Russia partnered with OPEC+ on coordinated oil production decisions and still plays a major role in global crude and refined product flows.
• Energy-importing powers (EU, India, China, many developing states) still treat both Russia and major Middle Eastern producers as critical to their energy security calculus.

If anything, Europe’s scramble to replace Russian gas and rebalance away from Russian oil underscored how central these suppliers remain.

5. Overall evaluation

The prediction bundled several specific, strong claims:

• Dramatic loss of geopolitical relevance for both Russia and the Middle East.
• A large‑scale breakup of the Middle East into ~30 countries.
• Russia becoming significantly less important internationally due to erosion of its oil‑based revenue.

None of these outcomes have materialized by late 2025:

• Russia is at the center of a major war and global realignment.
• The Middle East map has not fractured into dozens of new states.
• Both regions remain pivotal in energy and geopolitics, even as diversifications and clean‑energy transitions progress.

Because the key, concrete parts of the prediction have failed to occur within a reasonable time horizon (five years, with multiple large shocks in between), the best judgment is:

Result: wrong.