Summary

• China has in fact been heavily restricted from leading‑edge chips made by TSMC and other Western‑aligned fabs. TSMC stopped supplying Huawei with advanced chips in September 2020 after U.S. export‑control rule changes, and sweeping U.S. controls imposed in October 2022 further limited China’s access to high‑end semiconductors and manufacturing tools, with many Chinese tech and chip companies added to U.S. blacklists. (cnbc.com)
• Despite this, China has not invaded Taiwan or seized TSMC as of 29 November 2025. What we see instead is steadily intensifying military pressure—large‑scale PLA exercises encircling Taiwan in 2023 and the multi‑domain “Channel Thunder‑2025A” drills in April 2025—while major open‑source assessments still judge a full‑scale invasion in the near term as relatively unlikely, expecting continued coercion and intimidation instead. (en.wikipedia.org)
• There is strong evidence of serious contemplation of an invasion at the leadership level. CIA Director William Burns has publicly stated that U.S. intelligence shows Xi Jinping ordered the PLA to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027, a directive widely incorporated into the so‑called “Davidson window” (2021–2027) used in U.S. and allied planning. That clearly indicates high‑level planning for an invasion option, though not a decision to execute it. (dw.com)
• However, Beijing’s observable policy response to chip cut‑offs has focused on self‑reliance, not seizing TSMC. China has poured tens of billions of dollars into domestic semiconductor capacity via the National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund (“Big Fund”) and related industrial policies, backing firms such as SMIC, YMTC and Huawei, and pushing toward greater chip self‑sufficiency rather than physically taking over foreign fabs. (en.wikipedia.org)

Why this is rated ambiguous

• Parts of the prediction align with observable facts: China has been cut off from much leading‑edge TSMC/Western chip capacity, and top leadership is clearly preparing for a possible invasion of Taiwan, which is consistent with “serious contemplation.” (en.wikipedia.org)
• But the core causal claim—that being cut off from leading‑edge chips would drive Chinese leaders toward choosing a military move to seize TSMC—cannot be cleanly validated or falsified with open information. Internal deliberations in Beijing are opaque, and Xi’s invasion planning is also tied to long‑standing political and strategic goals (reunification, regional power projection), not just semiconductors.
• No explicit time frame was given for when they would “ultimately choose” such a move, and as of late 2025 they have not attempted an invasion. Whether chip cut‑offs will eventually tip the balance toward that choice remains uncertain.

Because the most decisive parts of the prediction depend on non‑public leadership motives and on future choices for which no deadline was specified, the claim cannot be definitively scored as right or wrong at this point; it is best classified as ambiguous.