As of November 29, 2025, the emerging U.S.–China "Cold War" has unfolded largely along the cyber/information and economic/financial dimensions Chamath described, with no large-scale conventional ground war between the two states.

1. Rivalry framed as a tech‑ and economy‑centric “new Cold War”
Scholars and analysts now commonly describe U.S.–China competition as a second or new Cold War centered on technology, digital dominance, and economic statecraft rather than classic battlefield confrontation. Academic work characterizes a U.S.–China “tech war” in which Washington seeks to maintain technological supremacy and restrict China’s access to critical technologies, especially semiconductors and AI, as the core arena of great‑power rivalry. (academic.oup.com) A broader narrative of an “AI Cold War” likewise describes the competition as being waged in AI and advanced computing rather than nuclear or purely ideological domains. (en.wikipedia.org)

2. “Fought with computers”: cyber, AI, and semiconductor competition
The United States has implemented sweeping export controls on advanced computing and semiconductor manufacturing equipment to limit China’s access to high‑end chips, explicitly framing this as a move to counter China’s high‑tech and AI ambitions. (en.wikipedia.org) Domestically, the CHIPS and Science Act directs tens of billions of dollars toward U.S. semiconductor manufacturing and high‑tech research, explicitly justified as a response to competition with China. (en.wikipedia.org) A 2024 revision of the long‑standing U.S.–China science and technology pact narrows cooperation and excludes strategic technologies such as AI and quantum computing, again indicating that the frontline of competition is technological rather than kinetic. (apnews.com)

In parallel, China and the U.S. are engaged in extensive cyber operations and digital espionage. U.S. government hearings and intelligence assessments have long identified China as the most active source of cyber‑espionage against U.S. intellectual property, with senior officials describing the resulting theft as the “greatest transfer of wealth in history.” (congress.gov) Analysts frame this activity—as well as disinformation, social‑media manipulation, and cyberattacks—as part of modern “fifth‑generation” or information‑centric warfare conducted below the threshold of open conflict. (en.wikipedia.org)

3. “Fought with money”: trade, sanctions, and financial tools
Economic and financial measures are central to the rivalry. Since the 2018–2019 trade war, the U.S. has repeatedly used tariffs, investment restrictions, export controls, and entity‑list sanctions to constrain Chinese technology firms and sectors, while China has responded with its own export controls (for example on critical minerals) and coercive trade measures against U.S. partners such as Taiwan and the Philippines. (en.wikipedia.org) The U.S. Congress has created dedicated bodies, such as the House Select Committee on Strategic Competition with the Chinese Communist Party, whose remit explicitly centers on economic, technological, and security competition rather than preparing for an imminent ground war. (en.wikipedia.org)

4. Absence of large‑scale conventional ground warfare; dominance of “gray‑zone” tactics
Despite heightened tensions—especially over Taiwan and in the South China Sea—there has been no large‑scale conventional ground war between the U.S. and China through 2025. Instead, China has relied heavily on “gray‑zone” tactics: aggressive coast‑guard and maritime‑militia operations, air incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone, economic coercion, cyberattacks, and disinformation campaigns intended to change the status quo without triggering direct war. (en.wikipedia.org) U.S. and allied responses have similarly emphasized deterrence, digital coalitions, and economic measures rather than preparing for immediate ground combat between U.S. and Chinese armies. (academic.oup.com)

5. Overall assessment
Chamath’s forecast was that the emergent U.S.–China “Cold War II” would be waged primarily via computers (cyber, information, and advanced technology) and money (trade, sanctions, and financial pressure), not through large‑scale ground combat. Five years on from his July 2020 statement, the observable pattern of U.S.–China competition matches this description: the rivalry is intense but is being conducted chiefly in technological, cyber, informational, and economic arenas, while both sides so far avoid direct conventional ground warfare.

Future escalation is possible, particularly around Taiwan, so this assessment is “right so far” rather than a guarantee about all future decades. But based on the evidence available in 2025, the prediction’s core claim about how this conflict is being fought has proven accurate.