Reasoning about timeframe

• Chamath’s prediction window is “over the next 15 to 20 years” from 2020, i.e. roughly 2035–2040. As of today (2025-11-29), only about 5 years of that period have elapsed, so we are far short of the horizon he specified.
• The claim is about Russia no longer fundamentally mattering in world affairs compared to other major powers. That’s a structural, long‑term geopolitical judgment, not something that can be definitively confirmed or falsified only a third of the way into the forecast window.

Current evidence (mid‑forecast) – Russia clearly still matters

• Russia’s full‑scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 dramatically reshaped European security, triggered large‑scale Western sanctions, and led to a major NATO expansion (Finland and Sweden joining), showing that Russia remains a central security actor in Europe and globally.
• Despite sanctions, Russia continues to be a top exporter of energy (oil, gas) and a key player in global commodity markets; its actions have affected global energy prices and food security via its role in Black Sea grain shipments.

These developments suggest that, so far, the prediction does not look accurate in the early years. However, because the forecast explicitly targets 15–20 years out, we cannot yet say whether the long‑term claim (by 2035–2040) will ultimately be right or wrong.

Conclusion

Given that the prediction is about Russia’s status by 2035–2040 and it is currently 2025, there has not been enough time for the forecast horizon to elapse. Therefore the correct classification today is:

• Result: inconclusive (too early to judge).