Chamath’s prediction was that over the next several years of Trump’s second administration, major U.S. industrial‑policy and tech initiatives would increasingly be structured so that, in exchange for special incentives, the federal government retains explicit upside (equity or royalty‑like revenue shares), rather than relying only on grants, loans, or tax credits.

So far, early 2025 evidence points in that direction:

• The U.S. government converted CHIPS Act grants and other funds into about a 10% non‑voting equity stake in Intel, plus warrants for an additional stake, explicitly framed as a shift from grants to ownership in a key semiconductor firm. (apnews.com)
• The Department of Energy restructured a $2.3B loan to Lithium Americas so that the U.S. takes a small equity stake in the company developing the Thacker Pass lithium mine; reporting describes this as part of a broader Trump push to acquire equity in critical‑mineral and tech supply‑chain companies (Intel, MP Materials, etc.). (apnews.com)
• The government took a 10% equity stake in Trilogy Metals tied to approval of the Ambler Access Project road in Alaska, directly linking permitting for a strategic mining corridor to ongoing upside in the project. (streetwisereports.com)
• An $80B Westinghouse nuclear‑reactor package includes profit‑sharing for the U.S. above a return threshold and a contingent 20% equity stake if Westinghouse later IPOs above a set valuation, giving the federal government a royalty‑like share of future gains. (washingtonpost.com)
• In the Nippon Steel–U.S. Steel deal, the U.S. government obtained a “golden share” with veto rights and board‑appointment power as a condition of approving the acquisition, with analysts describing this as effectively partial nationalization—another form of ongoing economic and governance participation tied to regulatory approval. (en.wikipedia.org)

At the same time, not all high‑profile initiatives follow this model: Ex‑Im Bank’s $100B energy push relies on credit guarantees and loans rather than equity; the Stargate AI infrastructure project is financed by OpenAI, SoftBank, Oracle, MGX, and lenders, with Trump mainly offering expedited permitting; and the TikTok U.S. divestiture compels a sale to a private consortium (Oracle, Silver Lake, MGX, etc.) without the federal government itself taking an equity or royalty stake. (ft.com)

However, as of November 30, 2025, Trump’s second term has been underway for only a little over 10 months. The prediction explicitly concerns what will happen over the next several years of this administration, and it further claims that this upside‑sharing model will increasingly structure major industrial and tech policy. That longer‑term trajectory—whether this approach becomes the dominant, sustained “template” versus a burst of early‑term experiments—cannot yet be known.

Because the specified multi‑year timeframe has not elapsed, and future policy or congressional/market pushback could still significantly alter the pattern, the status of the prediction is inconclusive (too early to definitively judge), even though early developments are directionally consistent with what Chamath described.