Evidence from official Saudi and Aramco statements shows that Saudi Arabia’s maximum sustainable oil production capacity was already around 12 million barrels per day (bpd) well before 2024, and the main capacity-expansion projects started years earlier, not in 2024.

Key facts:

1. 12 mbpd capacity existed before 2022

   • A March 11, 2020 Aramco press release says the Ministry of Energy directed Aramco to increase its maximum sustainable capacity (MSC) from 12 million bpd to 13 million bpd, which necessarily means 12 mbpd was already in place by 2020. (aramco.com)
   • In 2021 and May 2022, multiple reports state that Saudi Arabia’s current production capacity was about 12 million bpd, and that the plan was to boost this to more than 13 million bpd by 2026–2027. (thenationalnews.com)
     These sources contradict the premise that Saudi still had to build capacity to get from roughly 11 to 12 mbpd starting in 2024.

2. Expansion work to go beyond 12 mbpd began before 2024

   • Aramco outlined that the extra ~1 mbpd to reach 13 mbpd would come from major field projects (Berri, Marjan, Zuluf, plus others), describing incremental additions out to 2027—plans already active and being executed by 2022. (arabnews.jp)
     This again contradicts the claim that “they can only start the work in 2024.”

3. The 2024–2027 build-out Chamath described never materialized

   • In January 2024, Saudi Arabia ordered Aramco to halt the plan to raise capacity to 13 mbpd and to maintain MSC at 12 mbpd, effectively cancelling the further expansion. (al-monitor.com)
   • By October 2025, Aramco’s CEO was still describing the maximum sustainable capacity as 12 mbpd, which Aramco can sustain for a year, confirming no new step-up above 12 had been completed. (reuters.com)

Putting this together:

• The prediction specified that work to increase capacity from ~11 to 12 mbpd would only start in 2024 and finish in 2027.
• In reality, Saudi capacity was already ~12 mbpd by 2020, and the subsequent expansion projects toward 13 mbpd had started before 2024 and were then frozen in early 2024 rather than following the 2024–2027 build schedule Chamath described.

Because both the starting date (“can only start the work in 2024”) and the completion timing (“they’ll be done in 2027”) are inconsistent with what actually happened—and even the premise (that they still needed to build to 12 mbpd) is false—the prediction is wrong.