The prediction’s horizon is ~30 years from 2021 (i.e., until about 2051), and as of now (late 2025) we are only ~4 years into that window. It is therefore too early to judge whether globalism will be substantially “undone” over the full period.

That said, current evidence shows mixed but notable de‑globalization pressures, not a clear, completed reversal:

• Global trade as a share of world GDP fell after the 2008 crisis but has been relatively flat since, with a modest recovery post‑COVID. This suggests a slowdown or plateau in globalization rather than a sharp unwinding so far.
• There are strong de‑risking / friend‑shoring trends: U.S.‑China trade tensions and export controls, semiconductor and supply‑chain reshoring efforts, and more regional trade/investment blocs. Major institutions like the IMF and World Bank describe this as geoeconomic fragmentation and warn it could reduce long‑term global growth if it deepens.
• At the same time, cross‑border data flows, services trade, and digital integration remain robust, indicating that certain dimensions of globalization are still expanding even as goods trade and supply chains become more politically constrained.

Because the claim is about a substantial reversal over three decades, and current data only cover a small early slice of that period—and show partial, not decisive, unwinding—the prediction cannot yet be classified as clearly right or wrong. Hence: inconclusive (too early to tell).