Last updated Nov 29, 2025
Prediction
Chamath
techgovernment
Over the medium term (within several years of 2021), major U.S. big tech platforms will be regulated to the point that they effectively function as quasi-governmental utilities or quasi-nonprofits operating largely on behalf of national governments rather than as fully independent commercial enterprises.
It's going to be a quasi governmental organization. Exactly that the level of regulation at a government. But government level is going to be so onerous as to make these companies, quasi non-profits that work on behalf of countries.View on YouTube
Explanation

By late 2025, major U.S. big tech platforms (e.g., Alphabet/Google, Meta/Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Microsoft) remain highly profitable, independent commercial enterprises—not quasi-nonprofits or quasi-governmental utilities operating primarily on behalf of national governments.

Evidence:

  1. They remain strongly for‑profit, with massive earnings and market caps.

    • Alphabet (Google) reported tens of billions in annual net income and maintains a market capitalization well over a trillion dollars, driven by advertising and cloud profits.
    • Meta, Amazon, Apple, and Microsoft similarly report large operating margins and high stock valuations, driven by commercial business strategies rather than utility‑style rate regulation or cost‑plus models. (Any up‑to‑date earnings reports for these firms show substantial net income, confirming they are not operating as quasi‑nonprofits.)
  2. Regulation has increased, but not to the level of turning them into utilities.

    • In the U.S., there have been antitrust lawsuits (e.g., against Google and Meta) and hearings, plus discussions of platform regulation and content moderation rules, but Congress has not passed comprehensive federal legislation that reclassifies the major platforms as public utilities or imposes utility‑style rate or profit controls.
    • In the EU, the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and Digital Services Act (DSA) impose significant obligations on large platforms (gatekeepers) but explicitly leave them as private, for‑profit entities competing in markets; they are not converted into state‑directed utilities or non‑profit service arms of governments.
  3. Corporate control and strategic autonomy remain private.

    • Boards of directors and executive teams are appointed and removed via standard corporate governance and shareholder mechanisms, not by governments. No major U.S. platform has been nationalized, converted into a government‑chartered public utility, or required to operate on a non‑profit basis.
    • These firms routinely make strategic decisions (e.g., product changes, pricing, acquisitions, layoffs, advertising policies) primarily to optimize revenue, growth, or shareholder value, often in tension with government preferences and sometimes actively litigating against regulators.
  4. Relationship to governments is regulatory and adversarial, not an operational arm.

    • While big tech firms must comply with laws (privacy, competition, content, data access), they are not operating “on behalf of” governments in the way a quasi‑governmental utility would. They are regulated private intermediaries, frequently challenging rules in court and lobbying to shape legislation.

Because:

  • No major U.S. big tech firm has been structurally transformed into a quasi‑governmental utility or quasi‑nonprofit.
  • They still operate as highly profitable, shareholder‑driven corporations with substantial autonomy.
  • Regulatory burdens, though heavier than in 2021, have not reached the level of effectively converting their role into that of government utilities.

The prediction that, within several years of 2021, these platforms would function as quasi‑governmental, quasi‑nonprofit utilities working largely on behalf of governments is therefore wrong.