Chamath’s claim was that in the years after April 2022 the U.S. would not muster domestic political support for large‑scale, pro‑immigration policies sufficient to offset low birth rates and labor‑force shrinkage.

From 2022 through late 2025, Congress has not enacted any broad, expansionary immigration reform that significantly increases overall legal immigration numbers or creates large new permanent pathways. The main immigration‑related laws that have actually passed in this period, such as the Laken Riley Act and the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, are enforcement‑heavy measures focused on detention, deportation capacity, and border security rather than on expanding admissions or regularizing large numbers of workers. (en.wikipedia.org)

By contrast, bills that would be considered more pro‑immigration and economically oriented—like the American Families United Act, the Farm Workforce Modernization Act, and renewed efforts to reform per‑country green‑card caps for high‑skilled workers—remain proposals that have been introduced repeatedly but not enacted into law, indicating persistent lack of sufficient political sponsorship for major pro‑immigration reforms. (en.wikipedia.org)

Demographically, the Congressional Budget Office projects that U.S. deaths will exceed births around 2033 and assumes net immigration of roughly 1.1 million people per year—insufficient to prevent marked population aging and only modest overall population growth—under current law. (wsj.com) Although the Census Bureau reported that 2024 population growth was the highest in over two decades, driven largely by a one‑time surge in net international migration (~2.8 million), that spike was tied in part to temporary or humanitarian programs rather than a durable legislative shift. (apnews.com) In 2025, the Trump administration has moved in a more restrictive direction, revoking parole status for over 530,000 CHNV beneficiaries and sharply cracking down on immigration overall, with analyses warning that the U.S. could even see its first population decline as immigration drops and fertility stays low. (theguardian.com)

Taken together, these facts support Chamath’s contention: as of late 2025 the United States has not adopted major, durable pro‑immigration domestic policies at the scale demographers say would be needed to fully offset low birth rates and workforce shrinkage; if anything, the legislative center of gravity has remained either status‑quo or more restrictive. Therefore, his prediction is best judged as right.