Bond crisis looming? GOP abandons DOGE, Google disrupts Search with AI, OpenAI buys Jony Ive's IO

The prediction deadline is December 31, 2025. Today is November 30, 2025, so there is still one month left for the 10-year and 30-year U.S. Treasury yields to potentially reach or exceed the levels Chamath specified (10-year > 5.0%, 30-year > 6.25%).

As of late November 2025, publicly reported market data shows:

• The 10-year U.S. Treasury yield is below 5%.
• The 30-year U.S. Treasury yield is below 6.25%.

These current levels mean the prediction has not yet come true, but because the target date has not passed, it could still become correct (or definitively wrong) by year‑end. Therefore, the only appropriate evaluation at this time is “inconclusive (too early)”.

Note: Once data for yields on or after December 31, 2025 is available, the prediction can be definitively scored as right or wrong based on whether those thresholds were ever exceeded by that date.

The condition for the prediction was effectively met:

• The One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), the "big beautiful bill," passed the House on May 22, 2025, the Senate on July 1, 2025, and was signed into law on July 4, 2025.(en.wikipedia.org)
• CBO and independent estimates for both the House version and the enacted law show it raises, not lowers, deficits by roughly $2.8–3.4T over 2025–2034, i.e., there was no net “material fiscal tightening.”(reuters.com)

Chamath’s then-clause was that within 60–90 days of passage, bond markets would “react negatively” by demanding higher yields and/or showing clear stress in Treasury demand relative to prevailing long-term real/nominal rates (~5–5.5% on long bonds at the time).

What actually happened (July–early October 2025):

• Long-dated nominal yields were already near or above 5% before and around House passage and the Moody’s downgrade: the 30‑year hit about 5.15% on May 22 when the House first passed the bill.(webull.ca)
• Around enactment, monthly 30‑year yields were ~4.9%: May 4.90%, June 4.89%, July 4.92%. In the 60–90 days after signing (roughly Sept 2–Oct 2), the 30‑year averaged ~4.7–4.8%, slightly lower than the levels around passage (August 4.87%, September 4.74, October 4.64).(ycharts.com) There was no clear new spike above prior peaks; if anything, yields drifted modestly down from their May–July highs.
• A widely cited Reuters wrap on July 7 explicitly noted that the bond market’s reaction to final passage was “relatively muted” and that the expected deficit expansion from Trump’s agenda had "already been priced in"; investors were more focused on growth data and Fed policy than on the bill itself.(reuters.com)

Auction / demand stress evidence:

• There was a weak 20‑year auction and a sharp jump in long yields before final passage (May 21–22), reflecting concerns about fiscal policy and the Moody’s downgrade.(wsj.com) Those events predate the 60–90‑day post‑enactment window Chamath pointed to.
• Inside and around the window, the picture is mixed rather than clearly “crisis-like.” For example, an August 21 30‑year TIPS reopening cleared at a very high real yield of 2.65% (a 24‑year high) but with strong demand (bid‑to‑cover 2.78, yield stopping through when‑issued), which is the opposite of an impaired auction.(tipswatch.com)
• Some analyses in late September describe general auction strains (lower bid‑to‑cover, wider tails, waning foreign demand), but they tie this to the broader combination of heavy issuance, drained Fed reverse‑repo balances, and global fiscal worries—not to a discrete, new repricing of U.S. risk specifically in the 60–90 days after OBBBA’s enactment.(universalvalueadvisors.com) Other auctions (e.g., the September 10‑year note) actually showed strong demand and a stop‑through yield, again undercutting the notion of clear, generalized stress in that specific window.(streetinsider.com)

Putting this together:

• The bill did become law with overall fiscal loosening, so the condition trigger was satisfied.
• By 60–90 days after enactment, long-term yields were not meaningfully higher than at passage or the pre‑passage peak; they were marginally lower.
• Auction results in that interval show pockets of strain but also episodes of very strong demand, not an unambiguous negative repricing that would make it obvious “in the next 60 to 90 days” that markets had re‑underwritten U.S. fiscal risk at even higher required yields.

Given the time‑bound and directional nature of Chamath’s forecast (a distinct, clearly negative bond-market reaction after the bill became law), the realized data don’t match it. The structural fiscal concerns he highlighted are real and widely discussed, but the specific prediction about how and when bond markets would respond is not borne out by yields or auction behavior in that 60–90‑day window.

As of November 30, 2025 (about six months after the podcast), Google Search still opens with the familiar query box and a results page where AI Overviews and other AI features appear above or alongside traditional links, but not as a standalone, chat-style “AI Mode” default interface for most users. Google has expanded AI Overviews to 100+ countries and says they reach over 1–2 billion users monthly and now appear on a majority of U.S. queries, yet they are integrated into the classic results page and cannot be turned off, rather than replacing it entirely. (blog.google) AI Mode itself is an optional, more conversational experience (initially available only to a small percentage of U.S. users and later exposed as a tab/feature), and by mid‑2025 had around 100 million monthly active users in the U.S. and India—substantial, but still a minority of Google’s total search base and not the universal default “front door.” (theverge.com) Because the prediction’s deadline is May 2026 and we are only in November 2025, we cannot yet know whether Google will make this AI‑mode experience the default interface for a large share of users by that date, so the status of the prediction is currently too early to call.

As of November 30, 2025, OpenAI and Jony Ive have not yet fully revealed or shipped their consumer AI hardware device; only prototypes and high‑level descriptions have been discussed publicly, with launch timing pushed to 2026 or later. (theverge.com)

Leaked internal details reported by MacRumors (from a staff call reviewed by The Wall Street Journal) say the device will not be glasses and is instead a "third core device" that sits in your pocket or on your desk, not a phone and not something worn on the body. (macrumors.com) Subsequent court filings by OpenAI hardware chief Tang Tan, summarized by MacRumors and India Today, go further and state that the first product "is not an in‑ear device, nor a wearable device" and is at least a year away from being sold. (macrumors.com) That language strongly contradicts a pendant or smart‑glasses form factor.

However, because the final consumer device has not yet been launched or formally unveiled with its definitive form factor, there is still a theoretical chance that plans change before release. The available evidence today points against Jason’s pendant/glasses prediction, but since the decisive event (the ultimate public reveal of the shipping product) has not occurred yet, the outcome must be scored as **“inconclusive (too early)” rather than definitively right or wrong.