Trump's Cabinet, Google's Quantum Chip, Apple's Flop, TikTok, State of VC with bestie Keith Rabois

As of November 30, 2025, no company (including Google) has demonstrated a large‑scale, fault‑tolerant quantum computer capable of practically running Shor’s algorithm at scales that would actually break standard public‑key cryptosystems (e.g., 2048‑bit RSA, standard ECC curves) used on the internet.

Relevant current facts:

• Google’s major public milestones are still in the noisy intermediate‑scale quantum (NISQ) regime. After its 2019 “quantum supremacy” result with the 53‑qubit Sycamore processor, later work has focused on better qubits and error‑correction, not on a full‑scale, cryptography‑breaking device.
• Research papers and Google blog posts since then describe progress on error-corrected logical qubits and improved fidelities, but they do not claim any machine that can run Shor’s algorithm at cryptographically relevant sizes.
• Government and standards bodies are still operating under the assumption that cryptography‑breaking quantum computers do not yet exist, and are preparing via post‑quantum cryptography precisely because such machines are expected only in the future, on an uncertain timeline.

The prediction, however, explicitly allowed 3–7 years from around 2024 (i.e., roughly 2027–2031) for such a machine to exist in principle if Google continues on its trajectory. As of late 2025 we are only about 1–2 years into that window. There is not yet evidence that Google has achieved this, but there is also not yet enough time elapsed to say definitively that it won’t by 2027–2031.

Because the prediction is about capabilities by a future date that has not arrived yet, and current evidence doesn’t falsify the possibility that Google might get there within that 3–7 year window, the correct status today is “too early to tell.”

As of November 30, 2025, it is too early to judge Chamath’s 2–5 year prediction.

Key facts:

• Google’s Willow processor, announced in December 2024, has 105 physical superconducting qubits and demonstrates a few logical qubits with below‑threshold error correction, not thousands of logical qubits.(blog.google)
• Google itself and outside analysts emphasize that Willow is far from a “cryptanalytically relevant quantum computer”: estimates for breaking RSA‑2048 still sit around millions of physical qubits (roughly 4 million), with timelines typically a decade or more away, not 1–2 years.(theverge.com)
• Current overviews of quantum progress in 2025 describe systems in the ~10²–10³ qubit range and consistently state that we are still far from the fault‑tolerant, large‑scale machines needed to break RSA‑2048 or Bitcoin’s SHA‑256/ECDSA security; those capabilities are generally projected into the 2030s or later.(forbes.com)
• Policy and cybersecurity guidance (e.g., UK NCSC) likewise targets around 2035 as the planning horizon for serious quantum decryption threats, reinforcing that no such capability exists yet.(theguardian.com)
• There is no public evidence by late 2025 that RSA‑2048 has been broken by a quantum computer or that Bitcoin’s core cryptography has been compromised; instead, industry and governments are still treating this as a future risk and rolling out post‑quantum standards (e.g., NIST PQC).(en.wikipedia.org)

Because Chamath’s stated window is 2–5 years from 2024 (roughly 2026–2029), and only about one year has elapsed, we cannot yet say definitively whether quantum hardware will fail or succeed in reaching the ~4,000–8,000 logical‑qubit scale in that period. The current trajectory makes the prediction look very optimistic, but the deadline has not passed, so the correct classification for now is "inconclusive (too early)".