E144: Biden targets Elon, BRICS challenges the West, Tiger hit piece & more

Chamath predicted that if existing trends continued, the 2024 Republican primary would effectively become a two-way race between Donald Trump and Vivek Ramaswamy.

What actually happened:

• Vivek Ramaswamy suspended his presidential campaign on January 15, 2024, immediately after the Iowa caucuses, where he finished fourth behind Trump, Ron DeSantis, and Nikki Haley. He then endorsed Trump and exited the race. (theguardian.com)
• In Iowa, the first contest, Trump won with about 51%, DeSantis came second, Haley third, and Ramaswamy only fourth with about 7–8% of the vote. (en.wikipedia.org)
• In subsequent major contests like New Hampshire and through Super Tuesday, the competitive dynamic was Trump versus other establishment-aligned candidates (mainly Nikki Haley, with DeSantis earlier), not Trump versus Ramaswamy. Ramaswamy had already withdrawn and earned no delegates beyond Iowa. (en.wikipedia.org)

Because the race never narrowed into a Trump–Ramaswamy two-way contest—Ramaswamy instead exited early after a weak showing—the prediction did not come true.

Two key parts of Sacks’ forecast have not materialized by late 2025:

1. Membership scenario did not occur

   • As of 2025, the full BRICS members are Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the UAE, and Indonesia. Venezuela and Algeria are not members, and Kazakhstan is only a partner country, not a full member. (brics.br)
   • Venezuela has applied for BRICS membership and continues to campaign for entry, but its bid for even partner status was blocked and it remains outside the bloc. (en.sputniknews.africa)
   • Algeria has been authorized to join the BRICS New Development Bank, and was among those invited to become a BRICS partner, but it is not a BRICS member and did not complete the partner process by end‑2024. (geopoliticaleconomy.com)
   • Kazakhstan only obtained BRICS partner status starting January 1, 2025, which explicitly falls short of full membership. (brics.br)
     Sacks’s stated scenario “if BRICS adds Venezuela, Algeria and Kazakhstan … as soon as next year (2024)” has therefore not happened.

2. Energy control is far below 90% even after expansion

   • Official BRICS data after the 2024–25 expansion show the bloc accounts for about 43.6% of global oil production and 36% of global natural gas production. (brics.br)
   • Independent analyses of “BRICS+” that include major new oil producers (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran) find similar magnitudes: about 43–48% of world oil production and roughly 35–36% of global gas production/reserves, not anywhere close to 90%. (iris-france.org)
   • Fact‑checking outlets examining viral claims that an expanded BRICS controls 80% of global oil also conclude those numbers are false; best estimates remain just over 40% of world petroleum production. (factcheck.afp.com)

Given that (a) the specific admission of Venezuela, Algeria, and Kazakhstan as members did not happen “as soon as next year,” and (b) even with other major producers added, BRICS controls on the order of one‑half or less of global oil production and roughly a third of gas—far from “90% of all oil and gas traded globally”—Sacks’s prediction is wrong.

Since Chamath’s September 2023 comment, India’s realized and widely expected real GDP growth has indeed clustered around a ~7% medium‑term path. Official data and multilateral estimates show real GDP growth of about 8.2% in FY2023/24, well above 7%. (imf.org) Government and IMF estimates for FY2024/25 put growth in the mid‑6s (around 6.4–6.5%), implying an average of roughly 7.3% over FY2023/24–FY2024/25, despite some cooling after the post‑COVID rebound. (economictimes.indiatimes.com) Looking forward, the IMF projects real growth of 6.6% in FY2025/26 and 6.2% in FY2026/27, while the World Bank, ADB, and RBI cluster around 7% for FY2024/25 and roughly 6.7–7.2% for FY2025/26, i.e., a band centered very close to 7%. (worldbank.org) Taken together—one year clearly above 7%, the next slightly below, and credible forecasts for the following few years mostly between 6.5% and just over 7%—the medium‑term trajectory from 2023 through the mid‑2020s averages out to about 7% annual real GDP growth. That matches the spirit of his prediction (“~7% a year” as an ongoing pace rather than a one‑off spike), so it is best classified as right, acknowledging normal year‑to‑year variation around that level.

Olaf Scholz has in fact been removed from office through Germany’s democratic electoral process: in the 23 February 2025 federal election his SPD lost ground, a CDU/CSU–SPD coalition was formed, and Friedrich Merz was elected and sworn in as chancellor on 6 May 2025, replacing Scholz as head of government. (en.wikipedia.org) This matches the "voted out" mechanism for Scholz.

However, Emmanuel Macron remains President of France as of late 2025 and is constitutionally barred from seeking a third consecutive term: the 2027 French presidential election page and multiple reports note that he is term‑limited and cannot run again in 2027, meaning he will leave office when his mandate expires rather than by losing a popular vote. (en.wikipedia.org) Since Macron will step down due to term limits rather than being "voted out of office in a future election," the joint prediction that both Scholz and Macron would be voted out does not hold, so the normalized prediction is overall wrong.